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THE INTUITIVE APPEAL 
OF EXPLAINABLE MACHINES 
Andrew D. Selbst* & Solon Barocas** 
 
Algorithmic decision-making has become synonymous with inexplicable 
decision-making, but what makes algorithms so difficult to explain?  This 
Article examines what sets machine learning apart from other ways of 
developing rules for decision-making and the problem these properties pose 
for explanation.  We show that machine learning models can be both 
inscrutable and nonintuitive and that these are related, but distinct, 
properties. 
Calls for explanation have treated these problems as one and the same, 
but disentangling the two reveals that they demand very different responses.  
Dealing with inscrutability requires providing a sensible description of the 
rules; addressing nonintuitiveness requires providing a satisfying 
explanation for why the rules are what they are.  Existing laws like the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 
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and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as well as techniques 
within machine learning, are focused almost entirely on the problem of 
inscrutability.  While such techniques could allow a machine learning system 
to comply with existing law, doing so may not help if the goal is to assess 
whether the basis for decision-making is normatively defensible. 
In most cases, intuition serves as the unacknowledged bridge between a 
descriptive account and a normative evaluation.  But because machine 
learning is often valued for its ability to uncover statistical relationships that 
defy intuition, relying on intuition is not a satisfying approach.  This Article 
thus argues for other mechanisms for normative evaluation.  To know why 
the rules are what they are, one must seek explanations of the process behind 
a model’s development, not just explanations of the model itself. 
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There can be no total understanding and no absolutely reliable test of 
understanding. 
—Joseph Weizenbaum, “Contextual Understanding by Computers”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Algorithms increasingly inform consequential decisions about our lives, 
with only minimal input from the people they affect and little to no 
explanation as to how they work.2  This worries people, and rightly so.  The 
results of these algorithms can be unnerving,3 unfair,4 unsafe,5 
unpredictable,6 and unaccountable.7  How can decision makers who use 
algorithms be held to account for their results? 
It is perhaps unsurprising that, faced with a world increasingly dominated 
by automated decision-making, advocates, policymakers, and legal scholars 
would call for machines that can explain themselves.8  People have a natural 
 
 1. 10 COMM. ACM 474, 476 (1967).  In the 1960s, the project of artificial intelligence 
(AI) was largely to mimic human intelligence.  Weizenbaum was therefore actually arguing 
that computers will never fully understand humans.  The purpose of AI research has changed 
drastically today, but there is a nice symmetry in the point that humans will never have total 
understanding of computers. 
 2. Aaron M. Bornstein, Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently Inscrutable?, NAUTILUS 
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://nautil.us/issue/40/learning/is-artificial-intelligence-permanently-
inscrutable [http://perma.cc/RW3E-5CPV]; Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-
secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [http://perma.cc/7VYF-5XR7]; Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to 
Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/ 
can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html [http://perma.cc/3CYF-QTVC]. 
 3. See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy:  Technology, Privacy, 
and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 65–66 (2013); Sara M. Watson, Data 
Doppelgängers and the Uncanny Valley of Personalization, ATLANTIC (June 16, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/data-doppelgangers-and-the-
uncanny-valley-of-personalization/372780/ [http://perma.cc/7J3X-NK3C]. 
 4. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677–92 (2016); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 883–89 (2017); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data 
Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 126–39 (2017). 
 5. See, e.g., David Lazer et al., The Parable of Google Flu:  Traps in Big Data Analysis, 
343 SCIENCE 1203, 1203 (2014); Jennings Brown, IBM Watson Reportedly Recommended 
Cancer Treatments That Were ‘Unsafe and Incorrect,’ GIZMODO (July 25, 2018, 3:00 PM), 
https://gizmodo.com/ibm-watson-reportedly-recommended-cancer-treatments-tha-
1827868882 [http://perma.cc/E4RZ-NVZU]. 
 6. See, e.g., Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to 
Embodied Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51, 57–58 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin 
& Ian Kerr eds., 2016) (discussing unpredictability in autonomous systems); Jamie Condliffe, 
Algorithms Probably Caused a Flash Crash of the British Pound, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 7, 
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602586/algorithms-probably-caused-a-flash-
crash-of-the-british-pound/ [https://perma.cc/K9FM-6SJE]. 
 7. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society:  Due Process 
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18–27 (2014); Joshua A. Kroll et al., 
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (2017). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
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feel for explanation.  We know how to offer explanations and can often agree 
when one is good, bad, in-between, on point, or off topic.  Lawyers use 
explanation as their primary tradecraft:  judges write opinions, administrators 
respond to comments, litigators write briefs, and everyone writes memos.  
Explanations are the difference between a system that vests authority in 
lawful process and one that vests it in an unaccountable person.9 
Although we comfortably use explanations, asking someone to define the 
concept will often generate a blank look in response.  Analytically, 
explanation is infinitely variable, and there can be many valid explanations 
for a given phenomenon or decision.  Thus far, in both law and machine 
learning, the scholarly discourse around explanation has primarily revolved 
around two questions:  Which kinds of explanations are most useful, and 
which are technically available?10  Yet, these are the wrong questions or, at 
least, the wrong stopping points. 
Explanations of technical systems are necessary but not sufficient to 
achieve law and policy goals, most of which are concerned not with 
explanation for its own sake, but with ensuring that there is a way to evaluate 
the basis of decision-making against broader normative constraints such as 
antidiscrimination or due process.  It is therefore important to ask how 
exactly people engage with those machine explanations in order to connect 
them to the normative questions of interest to law. 
This Article argues that scholars and advocates who seek to use 
explanation to enable justification of machine learning models are relying on 
intuition to connect the explanation to normative concerns.  Intuition is both 
powerful and dangerous.  While this mode of justifying decision-making 
remains important, we must understand the benefits and weaknesses of 
connecting machine explanation to intuitions.  Remedying the limitations of 
intuition requires considering alternatives, which include institutional 
processes, documentation, and access to those documents. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I examines the various anxieties 
surrounding the use of automated decision-making.  After discussing 
secrecy, lack of transparency, and lack of technical expertise, Part I argues 
that the two distinct, but similar, concepts that truly set machine learning 
decision-making apart are inscrutability and nonintuitiveness. 
Part II examines laws and machine learning techniques designed 
specifically to address the problem of inscrutable decisions.  On the legal 
side, Part II.A discusses the “adverse action notices” required by federal 
credit laws11 and the informational requirements of the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).12  On the technical side, Part 
 
 9. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (1995). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. This Article will focus on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x, 
and Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f. 
 12. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 
(EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
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II.B discusses various techniques used by computer scientists to make 
machine learning models interpretable, including designing for simplicity, 
approximating complex models in simpler form, extracting the most 
important factors in a particular decision, and allowing some degree of 
interaction with the models to see how changes in inputs affect outputs.  
These techniques can be useful in meeting the requirements of the law, but 
such explanations, even when they comply with the law, may be of limited 
practical utility. 
Part III builds the connection between explanation and intuition before 
evaluating the merits of an intuition-centered approach to justification.  It 
canvasses reasons besides justification that one might want explainable 
machines—dignity or autonomy on the one hand and consumer or data-
subject education on the other—before concluding that neither is adequate to 
fully address the concerns with automated decision-making.  Interrogating 
the assumptions behind a third reason—that explanation will reveal problems 
with the basis for decision-making—demonstrates the reliance on intuition.  
The remainder of Part III examines the value and limitations of intuition.  
With respect to machine learning in particular, although intuition can root 
out obviously good or bad cases, it cannot capture the cases that give machine 
learning its greatest value:  true patterns that exceed human imagination. 
These cases are not obviously right or wrong, but simply strange. 
Part IV aims to provide another way.  Once outside the black box, all that 
is left is to question the process surrounding its development and use.  There 
are large parts of the process of machine learning that do not show up in a 
model but can contextualize its operation, such as paths considered but not 
taken and the constraints that influence these choices.  Where intuition is 
insufficient to determine whether the model’s rules are reasonable or rest on 
valid relationships, justification can sometimes be achieved by 
demonstrating and documenting due care and thoughtfulness. 
I.  INSCRUTABLE AND NONINTUITIVE 
Scholarly and policy debates about regulating a world controlled by 
algorithms have been mired in difficult questions about how to observe, 
access, audit, or understand those algorithms.13  The difficulty has been 
attributed to a diverse set of problems, specifically that algorithms are 
 
 13. See, e.g., Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Researching Algorithms, 20 
INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 14 (2017) (evaluating methods of researching algorithms); Malte 
Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms:  Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 3 
(2016); Solon Barocas, Sophie Hood & Malte Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms:  A Provocation 
Piece (Mar. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245322 [https://perma.cc/DB7Z-C9A6]; Nick Seaver, Knowing 
Algorithms (Feb. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55eb 
004ee4b0518639d59d9b/t/55ece1bfe4b030b2e8302e1e/1441587647177/seaverMiT8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7HG3-74U3]. 
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“secret”14 and “opaque”15 “black boxes”16 that are rarely, if ever, made 
“transparent”;17 that they operate on the basis of correlation rather than 
“causality”18 and produce “predictions”19 rather than “explanations”;20 that 
their behavior may lack “intelligibility”21 and “foreseeability”;22 and that 
they challenge established ways of being “informed”23 or “knowing.”24  
These terms are frequently used interchangeably or assumed to have 
overlapping meanings.  For example, opacity is often seen as a synonym for 
secrecy,25 an antonym for transparency,26 and, by implication, an 
impediment to understanding.27  Yet the perceived equivalence of these 
terms has obscured important differences between distinct problems that 
frustrate attempts at regulating algorithms—problems that must be 
disentangled before the question of regulation can even be addressed. 
This Part argues that many of these challenges are not unique to algorithms 
or machine learning.  We seek here to parse the problems raised by machine 
learning models more precisely and argue that they have little to do with the 
fact that their very existence may be unknown, that their inner workings may 
be opaque, or that an understanding of their operations may require 
specialized knowledge.  What sets machine learning models apart from other 
decision-making mechanisms are their inscrutability and nonintuitiveness.  
 
 14. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 236–37 (2011) (recounting the origins of using trade-secret 
protections for algorithms); Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy:  An 
Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models 
Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 88–90 (2011) (discussing the use of 
trade-secret protections for algorithms, which result in lack of transparency concerning 
algorithmic decision-making). 
 15. Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks”:  Understanding Opacity in Machine 
Learning Algorithms, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1, 3–5; Roger Allan Ford & W. 
Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2016); Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions:  An 
Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision 
Making, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 118, 129 (2016). 
 16. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 8 (2015). 
 17. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 27; Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent 
Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1506. 
 18. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 4, at 875. 
 19. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”:  Explanatory Standards in the Age of 
Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1267–68 (2017). 
 20. See, e.g., Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on 
Algorithmic Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation,” 38 AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50, 
55. 
 21. See, e.g., Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1253. 
 22. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 6, at 52. 
 23. See, e.g., Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to 
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection 
Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 89–90 (2017). 
 24. Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing:  Limitations of the 
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y 973, 974–77 (2018). 
 25. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 26. See, e.g., Ford & Price, supra note 15, at 12; Zarsky, supra note 15, at 124. 
 27. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 15, at 4–5. 
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We adapt and extend a taxonomy first proposed by Jenna Burrell,28 where 
our primary purpose is to emphasize these last two properties and clear up 
confusion.29  Inscrutability and nonintuitiveness have been conflated in the 
past:  where the property of inscrutability suggests that models available for 
direct inspection may defy understanding, nonintuitiveness suggests that 
even where models are understandable, they may rest on apparent statistical 
relationships that defy intuition.30 
A.  Secret 
The first common critique of algorithmic decision-making is secrecy.  
Secrecy captures two related, but distinct, concerns:  (1) secrecy of the 
model’s existence and (2) secrecy of its operation. 
The first concern is as old as the original Code of Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs), the conceptual basis for the majority of privacy laws:31  
“There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very 
existence is secret.”32  This principle underlies more recent calls to “end 
secret profiling” involving algorithms and machine learning, where secrecy 
is understood as a purposeful attempt to maintain ignorance of the very fact 
of profiling.33 
While such worries are particularly pronounced when the government 
engages in algorithmic decision-making,34 similar objections arise in the 
commercial sector, where there are a remarkable number of scoring systems 
 
 28. See generally id. 
 29. Our parsing of the issues is similar to the taxonomy proposed by Ed Felten in a short 
blog post on Freedom to Tinker. Ed Felten, What Does It Mean to Ask for an “Explainable” 
Algorithm?, FREEDOM TO TINKER (May 31, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/05/31/ 
what-does-it-mean-to-ask-for-an-explainable-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/QF7B-RTC6]. 
 30. We intentionally use the term “nonintuitive” rather the word “unintuitive” or 
“counterintuitive.”  In our view, “unintuitive” implies a result that would not be expected but 
is easily understood once explained, and “counterintuitive” suggests a phenomenon that is 
opposite one’s expectations.  Instead, we intend to refer to a phenomenon about which 
intuitive reasoning is not possible. 
 31. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT:  THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 56 (2018); Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices:  A Basic 
History 3 (Apr. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-
FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9E-HK9A] (discussing the history of the FIPs). 
 32. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41 (1973), 
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TG8-FBL9].  In 
fact, the newly effective GDPR requires, among other things, disclosure of the “existence” of 
an automated decision-making tool. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 33. Algorithmic Transparency:  End Secret Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/ZW4W-HKTM] (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018); see also Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1745–46 
(2015). 
 34. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet 
Profiling:  Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 262–
70 (2008); Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 285, 295–97 (2011). 
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of which consumers are simply unaware.35  In many cases, this ignorance 
exists because the companies engaged in such scoring are serving other 
businesses rather than consumers.36  But the fact that more recent forms of 
hidden decision-making involve algorithms or machine learning does not 
change the fundamental secrecy objection—that affected parties are not 
aware of the existence of the decision-making process.37 
The second secrecy concern arises where the existence of a decision-
making process is known, but its actual operation is not.  Affected parties 
might be aware that they are subject to such decision-making but have limited 
or no knowledge of how the decision-making process works.38  Among the 
many terms used to describe this situation, “opacity” seems most apt, as there 
is enough visibility to see that the model exists but not enough to discern any 
of its details. 
While this is perhaps the most frequent critique of algorithms and machine 
learning—that their inner workings remain undisclosed or inaccessible39—
it, too, has little to do with the technology specifically.  It is an objection to 
being subject to a decision where the basis of decision-making remains 
secret, which is a situation that can easily occur without algorithms or 
machine learning.40 
There are sometimes valid reasons for companies to withhold details about 
a decision-making process.  Where a decision-making process holds financial 
and competitive value and where its discovery entails significant investment 
or ingenuity, firms may claim protection for its discovery as a trade secret.41  
Trade-secret protection applies only when firms purposefully restrict 
disclosure of proprietary methods,42 which creates incentives for firms to 
maintain secrecy around the basis for decision-making.  If the use of 
algorithms or machine learning uniquely increases up-front investment or 
competitive advantage, then the incentives to restrict access to the details of 
 
 35. See PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, THE SCORING OF AMERICA:  HOW SECRET 
CONSUMER SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE 84 (2014), 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_ 
America_April2014_fs.pdf [https://perma.cc/39RJ-97M6]. 
 36. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS:  A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY i (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-
call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527 
databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HQY-6WVP]. 
 37. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., supra note 32, at 29 
(discussing the lack of awareness of record keeping and use of personal data). 
 38. This could refer to secrecy around what data is considered or how it is used. See infra 
Part II.A for a discussion of these concerns with respect to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
 39. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the 
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 107–08 (2018); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 
10–11.  See generally PASQUALE, supra note 16. 
 40. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:  Computer Databases and Metaphors 
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407, 1410 (2001) (discussing the private 
database industry and corporate decision-making based on consumer data). 
 41. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 39, at 153–60.  See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, 
Liberty, and Trade Secrets:  Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1343 (2018). 
 42. Pasquale, supra note 14, at 237. 
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the decision-making process might be understood as peculiar to algorithms 
or machine learning.  But if other attempts to develop decision-making 
processes without algorithms or machine learning involve similar costs and 
competitive advantage, then there is nothing special about the relationship 
between these technologies, trade secrets, and resistance to disclosure.43 
Firms may also reject requests for further details about the basis for 
decision-making if they anticipate that such details may enable strategic 
manipulation, or “gaming,” of the inputs to the decision-making process.44  
If the costs of manipulating one’s characteristics or behavior are lower than 
the expected benefits, rational actors would have good incentive to do so.45  
Yet these dynamics, too, apply outside algorithms and machine learning; in 
the face of some fixed decision procedure, people will find ways to engage 
in strategic manipulation.  The question is whether decision procedures 
developed with machine learning are easier or harder to game than those 
developed using other methods—this is not a question that can be answered 
in general. 
B.  Requiring Specialized Knowledge 
One common approach to ensuring accountability for software-reliant 
decision-making is to require the disclosure of the underlying source code.46  
While such disclosure might seem helpful in figuring out how automated 
decisions are rendered, the ability to make sense of the disclosed source code 
will depend on one’s level of technical literacy.  Some minimal degree of 
training in computer programming is necessary to read code, although even 
that might not be enough.47  The problem, then, is greater than disclosure; in 
 
 43. See, e.g., David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability:  Trade Secrets in Our 
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 139 (2007) (describing the growing application of 
trade secrecy in various technologies used in public infrastructure). 
 44. Jane Bambauer & Tal Z. Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3135949 [http://perma.cc/N62U-3UUK]. 
 45. Whether such manipulation is even possible will vary from case to case, depending 
on the degree to which the decision considers immutable characteristics and nonvolitional 
behavior.  At the same time, it is unclear how easily one could even change the appearance of 
one’s characteristics without genuinely changing those characteristics in the process.  Altering 
behavior to game the system might involve adjustments that actually change a person’s 
likelihood of having the sought-after quality or experiencing the event that such behavior is 
meant to predict.  To the extent that “gaming” is a term used to describe validating rather than 
defeating the objectives of a decision system, this outcome should probably not be considered 
“gaming” at all. See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 44. 
 46. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify:  A Guide to Algorithms and the 
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2017); Kroll et al., supra note 7, at 647–50; Algorithmic 
Transparency:  End Secret Profiling, supra note 33.  Draft legislation in New York City also 
specifically focused on this issue, but the eventual bill convened a more general task force to 
consider different approaches. See Jim Dwyer, Showing the Algorithms Behind New York City 
Services, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/nyregion/ 
showing-the-algorithms-behind-new-york-city-services.html [https://perma.cc/38V5-P3EE]. 
 47. Desai & Kroll, supra note 46, at 5 (“[F]undamental limitations on the analysis of 
software meaningfully limit the interpretability of even full disclosures of software source 
code.”); Kroll et al., supra note 7, at 647. 
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the absence of the specialized knowledge required to understand source code, 
disclosure may offer little value to affected parties and regulators. 
As Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford have observed, “Transparency 
concerns are commonly driven by a certain chain of logic:  observation 
produces insights which create the knowledge required to govern and hold 
systems accountable.”48  The process of moving from observation to 
knowledge to accountability cannot be assumed; in many cases, the ability to 
leverage observations for accountability requires preexisting knowledge that 
allows observers to appreciate the significance of a disclosure.49  
Transparency of systems of decision-making is important, but incomplete.50  
But while cultivating the knowledge necessary to read source code requires 
time and effort, the problem of expertise—like the problem of secrecy—is 
not unique to algorithms. 
C.  Inscrutable 
Rather than programming computers by hand with explicit rules, machine 
learning relies on pattern-recognition algorithms and a large set of examples 
to uncover relationships in the data that might serve as a reliable basis for 
decision-making.51  The power of machine learning lies not only in its ability 
to relieve programmers of the difficult task of producing explicit instructions 
for computers, but in its capacity to learn subtle relationships in data that 
humans might overlook or cannot recognize.  This power can render the 
models developed with machine learning exceedingly complex and, 
therefore, impossible for a human to parse. 
We define this difficulty as “inscrutability”—a situation in which the rules 
that govern decision-making are so complex, numerous, and interdependent 
that they defy practical inspection and resist comprehension.  While there is 
a long history to such concerns, evidenced most obviously by the term 
“byzantine,” the complexity of rules that result from machine learning can 
far exceed those of the most elaborate bureaucracy.52  The challenge in such 
circumstances is not a lack of awareness, disclosure, or expertise, but the 
sheer scope and sophistication of the model.53 
Intuitively, complexity would seem to depend on the number of rules 
encoded by a model, the length of a rule (i.e., the number of factors that figure 
into the rule), and the logical operations involved in the rule.  These 
properties, however, can be specified more precisely.  Four mathematical 
 
 48. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 24, at 974. 
 49. Burrell, supra note 15, at 4. 
 50. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1254–55 (2008); Kroll et al., supra note 7, at 639, 657–60. 
 51. See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data:  What Legal Scholars Should 
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 655 (2017). 
 52. Byzantine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
Byzantine [https://perma.cc/97CM-KNT2] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (defining the term as 
“intricately involved”). 
 53. Burrell, supra note 15, at 4–5. 
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properties related to model complexity are linearity, monotonicity, 
continuity, and dimensionality. 
A linear model is one in which there is a steady change in the value of the 
output as the value of the input changes.54  Linear models tend to be easier 
for humans to understand and interpret because the relationship between 
variables is stable and lends itself to straightforward extrapolation.55  In 
contrast, the behavior of nonlinear models can be far more difficult to predict, 
even when they involve simple mathematical operations like exponential 
growth.56 
A monotonic relationship between variables is a relationship that is either 
always positive or always negative.57  That is, for every change in input 
value, the direction of the corresponding change in output value will remain 
consistent, whether an increase or decrease.58  Monotonicity aids 
interpretability because it too permits extrapolation and guarantees that the 
value of the output only moves in one direction.59  If, however, the value of 
the output goes up and down haphazardly as the value of the input moves 
steadily upward, the relationship between variables can be difficult to grasp 
or predict. 
Discontinuous models include relationships where changes in the value of 
one variable do not lead to a smooth change in the associated value of 
another.60  Discontinuities can render models far less intuitive because they 
make it impossible to think in terms of incremental change.  A small change 
in input may typically lead to small changes in outputs, except for occasional 
and seemingly arbitrary large jumps.61 
The dimensionality of a model is the number of variables it considers.62  
Two-dimensional models are easy to understand because they can be 
visualized graphically with a standard plot (with the familiar x and y axes).63  
Three-dimensional models also lend themselves to effective visualization (by 
adding a z axis), but humans have no way to visualize models with more than 
three dimensions.64  While people can grasp relationships between multiple 
 
 54. Mathematically, this means that the function is described by a constant slope, which 
can be represented by a line. Yin Lou et al., Intelligible Models for Classification and 
Regression, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 150, 150 (2012). 
 55. See id. at 151. 
 56. Cf. DEMI, ONE GRAIN OF RICE:  A MATHEMATICAL FOLKTALE (1997). 
 57. See Monotonicity Function, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 
2014). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Continuous Function, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 
2014) (noting that a continuous function does not suddenly jump at a given point or take 
widely differing values arbitrarily close to that point). 
 61. See Discontinuity, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014). 
 62. See Dimension (Dimensionality), A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (7th ed. 
2016). 
 63. See Cartesian Plane, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014). 
 64. See Cartesian Space, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014); 
n-Dimensional Space, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014). 
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variables without the aid of a graph, we will struggle to understand the full 
set of relationships that the model has uncovered as the number of 
dimensions grows.  The more variables that the model includes, the more 
difficult it will be to keep all the interactions between variables in mind and 
thus predict how the model would behave given any particular input.65 
In describing how these properties of models might frustrate human 
understanding, we have relied on terms like intuition, extrapolation, and 
prediction.  The same cognitive capacity underlies all three:  mentally 
simulating how a model turns inputs into outputs.66  As computer scientist 
Zachary Lipton explains, simulatability—the ability to practically execute a 
model in one’s mind—is an important form of understanding a model.67  
Such simulations can be either complete or partial.  In the former, a person 
is able to turn any combination of inputs into the correct outputs, while in the 
latter, understanding might be limited to the relationships between a subset 
of input and output variables (i.e., how changes in certain inputs affect the 
output). 
Simulation is a remarkably flat and functional definition of understanding, 
but it seems like a minimum requirement for any more elaborate definition.68  
This notion of understanding has nothing to say about why the model behaves 
the way it does; it is simply a way to account for the facility with which a 
person can play out how a model would behave under different 
circumstances.  When models are too complex for humans to perform this 
task, they have reached the point of inscrutability. 
D.  Nonintuitive 
A different line of criticism has developed that takes issue with disclosures 
that reveal some basis for decision-making that defies human intuition about 
the relevance of certain variables.69  The problem in such cases is not 
 
 65. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 51, at 700. 
 66. Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2016 ICML WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN MACHINE LEARNING 96, 98 (2016). 
 67. Id. 
 68. While we limit our discussion to simulatability, inscrutability is really a broader 
concept.  In particular, models might be difficult to understand if they consider features or 
perform operations that do not have some ready semantic meaning. Burrell, supra note 15, at 
10.  For example, a deep-learning algorithm can learn on its own which features in an image 
are characteristic of different objects (the standard example being cats). Bornstein, supra note 
2.  Part III.A.3, infra, returns to one such example that involves distinguishing between wolves 
and huskies. See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.  An algorithm will usually learn 
to detect edges that differentiate an object from its background, but it might also engineer 
features on its own that have no equivalent in human cognition and therefore defy description. 
See Lipton, supra note 66, at 98 (discussing decomposability).  This aspect of inscrutability, 
however, is of slightly less concern for this Article.  Most methods that are common in the 
kinds of applications that apportion important opportunities (e.g., credit) involve features that 
have been handcrafted by experts in the domain (e.g., length of employment) and accordingly 
will usually not face this problem. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 69. Deborah Gage, Big Data Uncovers Some Weird Correlations, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 
2014, 4:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-data-helps-companies-find-some-
surprising-correlations-1395168255 [https://perma.cc/8KYB-LP9W]; Quentin Hardy, 
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inscrutability, but an inability to weave a sensible story to account for the 
statistical relationships in the model.70  Although the statistical relationship 
that serves as the basis for decision-making might be readily identifiable, that 
relationship may defy intuitive expectations about the relevance of certain 
criteria to the decision.71  As Paul Ohm explains: 
We are embarking on the age of the impossible-to-understand reason, when 
marketers will know which style of shoe to advertise to us online based on 
the type of fruit we most often eat for breakfast, or when the police know 
which group in a public park is most likely to do mischief based on the way 
they do their hair or how far from one another they walk.72 
Even though it is clear which statistical relationships serve as the basis for 
decision-making in this case, why such statistical relationships exist is 
mystifying.  This is a crucial and consistent point of confusion.  The demand 
for intuitive relationships is not the demand for disclosure or accessible 
explanations; it is a demand that decision-making rely on reasoning that 
comports with intuitive understanding of the phenomenon in question.  In 
social science, similar expectations are referred to as “face validity”—the 
subjective sense that some measure is credible because it squares with our 
existing understanding of the phenomenon.73  While such demands are not 
unique to algorithms and machine learning, the fact that such computational 
tools are designed to uncover relationships that defy human intuition explains 
why the problem will be particularly pronounced in these cases. 
Critics have pinned this problem on the use of “[m]ere correlation”74 in 
machine learning, which frees it to uncover reliable, if incidental, 
relationships in the data that can then serve as the basis for consequential 
decision-making.75  Despite being framed as an indictment of correlational 
analysis, however, it is really an objection to decision-making that rests on 
particular correlations that defy familiar causal stories76—even though these 
stories may be incorrect.77  This has led to the mistaken belief that forcing 
 
Bizarre Insights from Big Data, N.Y. TIMES:  BITS (Mar. 28, 2012, 8:17 PM), 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/bizarre-insights-from-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/ 
GKW2-KN8T]. 
 70. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1280–97. 
 71. See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1309, 1318 (2012). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally Ronald R. Holden, Face Validity, in 2 CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 637 (Irving B. Weiner & W. Edward Craighead eds., 4th ed. 2010). 
 74. Kim, supra note 4, at 875, 883. 
 75. Id.; see also James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible 
Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 173 (2016). 
 76. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 19, at 1280–97. 
 77. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 199–200 (2011) (discussing the 
“narrative fallacy”); id. at 224 (“Several studies have shown that human decision makers are 
inferior to a prediction formula even when they are given the score suggested by the formula!  
They feel that they can overrule the formula because they have additional information about 
the case, but they are wrong more often than not.”). 
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decision-making to rest on causal mechanisms rather than mere correlations 
will ensure intuitive models.78 
Causal relationships can be exceedingly complex and nonintuitive, 
especially when dealing with human behavior.79  Indeed, causal relationships 
uncovered through careful experimentation can be as elaborate and 
unexpected as the kinds of correlations uncovered in historical data with 
machine learning.80  If we consider all the different factors that cause a 
person to take an action—mood, amount of sleep, food consumption, rational 
choice, and many other things—it quickly becomes clear that causality is not 
particularly straightforward.81  The only advantage of models that rely on 
causal mechanisms in such cases would be the reliability of their predictions 
(because the models would be deterministic rather than probabilistic), not the 
ability to interrogate whether the identified causal relationships comport with 
human intuitions and values.  Given that much of the interest in causality 
stems from an unwillingness to simply defer to predictive accuracy as a 
justification for models, improved reliability will not be a satisfying answer. 
*          *          * 
The demand for intuitive relationships reflects a desire to ensure that there 
is a way to assess whether the basis of decision-making is sound, as a matter 
of validity and as a normative matter.  We want to be able to do more than 
simply simulate a model; we want to be able to evaluate it.  One way to 
ensure this possibility is to force a model to rely exclusively on features that 
bear a manifest relationship to the outcome of interest, on the belief that well-
justified decisions are those that rest on relationships that conform to familiar 
and permissible patterns. 
Achieving this type of intuitiveness requires addressing inscrutability as a 
starting point.  An understandable model is necessary because there can be 
nothing intuitive about a model that resists all interrogation.  But addressing 
inscrutability is not sufficient.  A simple, straightforward model might still 
defy intuition if it has not been constrained to only use variables with an 
intuitive relationship to the outcome.82 
 
 78. These critiques also presume that causal mechanisms that exhaustively account for the 
outcomes of interest actually exist (e.g., performance on the job, default, etc.), yet certain 
phenomena might not be so deterministic; extrinsic random factors may account for some of 
the difference in the outcomes of interest. Jake M. Hofman, Amit Sharma & Duncan J. Watts, 
Prediction and Explanation in Social Systems, 355 SCIENCE 486, 488 (2017). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Attempts to model causation require limiting the features considered as potential 
causes because, to a certain extent, almost any preceding event could conceivably be causally 
related to the later one. JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY:  MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE 401–
28 (2d ed. 2009). 
 82. See, e.g., Jiaming Zeng, Berk Ustun & Cynthia Rudin, Interpretable Classification 
Models for Recidivism Prediction, 180 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 689 (2017).  Note that in this 
and related work, the researchers limit themselves to features that are individually and 
intuitively related to the outcome of interest. See id. at 693–97.  If these methods begin with 
features that do not have such a relationship, the model might be simple enough to inspect but 
too strange to square with intuition. See infra Part III.B. 
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Insisting on intuitive relationships is not the only way to make a model 
evaluable.  To the extent that intuitiveness is taken to be an end in itself rather 
than a particular means to the end of ensuring sound decision-making, its 
proponents risk overlooking other, potentially more effective, ways to 
achieve the same goal.  The remainder of this Article considers the different 
paths we might take to use explanations of machine learning models to 
regulate them. 
II.  LEGAL AND TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO INSCRUTABILITY 
This moment is not the first time that law and computer science have 
attempted to address algorithmic decision-making with explanation 
requirements.  Credit scoring has long been regulated, in part, by requiring 
“adverse action notices,” which explain adverse decisions to consumers.83  In 
Europe, concern about automated decisions has been a neglected part of data 
protection law for more than two decades, with interest in them reinvigorated 
by the GDPR.84  On the machine learning side, the subfield of 
“interpretability”—within which researchers have been attempting to find 
ways to understand complex models—is over thirty years old.85 
What seems to emerge from the law and computer science is a focus on 
two kinds of explanation.  The first concerns accounting for outcomes—how 
particular inputs lead to a particular output.  The second concerns the logic 
of decision-making—full or partial descriptions of the rules of the system.  
This Part reviews the legal and technical approaches to outcome and logic-
based explanations. 
A.  Legal Requirements for Explanation 
Though much of the current concern over inscrutable systems stems from 
the growing importance of machine learning, inscrutable systems predate this 
technique.  As a result, regulations that require certain systems to explain 
themselves already exist.  This section discusses two examples of legal 
systems and strategies that rely on different types of explanations:  credit 
reporting statutes, which rely on outcome-based explanations, and the 
GDPR, which mandates logic-based explanations.  Credit scoring predates 
machine learning, and is governed by two statutes:  the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA)86 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).87  Statistical 
credit-scoring systems take information about consumers as inputs, give the 
 
 83. See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, art. 3(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC) [hereinafter Data 
Protection Directive]. 
 85. See, e.g., William van Melle, Edward H. Shortliffe & Bruce G. Buchanan, EMYCIN:  
A Knowledge Engineer’s Tool for Constructing Rule-Based Expert Systems, in RULE-BASED 
EXPERT SYSTEMS:  THE MYCIN EXPERIMENT OF THE STANFORD HEURISTIC PROGRAMMING 
PROJECT 302 (Bruce G. Buchanan & Edward H. Shortliffe eds., 1984). 
 86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012). 
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inputs certain point values, add them to obtain a total score, and then make 
decisions based on that score.  Each of these statutes require “adverse action 
notices” that must include a statement of reasons for denials of credit or other 
credit-based outcomes.88  This is an example of what we call outcome-based 
explanations:  a description of the facts that proved relevant to a decision, but 
not a description of the decision-making rules themselves. 
Articles 13–15 of the GDPR require data subjects to have access to 
“meaningful information about the logic involved” in any automated 
decision-making that significantly affects them.89  As the law is still new, the 
import and proper interpretation of this requirement remain unclear.  In 
advance of a definitive interpretation, the GDPR appears to ask for a 
functional description of the model—enough of a description of the rules 
governing decision-making such that a data subject can vindicate her 
substantive rights under the GDPR and human rights laws.90  This is an 
example of logic-based explanations:  a description of the reasoning behind 
a decision, not just the relevant inputs to the decision. 
1.  FCRA, ECOA, and Regulation B 
The most straightforward legal requirement to explain inscrutable 
decision-making is the adverse action notice.  In 1970, Congress passed 
FCRA91 to begin to rein in the unregulated credit industry.  FCRA was “the 
first information privacy legislation in the United States.”92  It limits to whom 
and for what purposes credit reports can be disclosed,93 allows consumers 
access to their credit reports,94 and requires credit reporting agencies 
(CRAs)—for example, Experian, Transunion, and Equifax—to employ 
procedures to ensure accuracy and govern dispute resolution.95  FCRA was 
not initially concerned with how decisions were made, but rather with the 
then-new phenomenon of amassing large quantities of information.96  Four 
years later, however, Congress passed ECOA97 and took aim at the decision-
 
 88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m, 1691d(2). 
 89. GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 13(f)(2), 14(g)(2), 15(1)(h) (requiring access to 
“meaningful information about the logic” of automated decisions). 
 90. See Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to 
Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233, 236 (2017).  There is a vigorous debate in the 
literature about the “right to explanation” in the GDPR. See infra notes 143–45 and 
accompanying text.  As a discussion of positive law, this debate is connected to, but different 
than, the point we seek to make about the GDPR—that it is one example of a law that operates 
by asking for the logic of a system.  Even if there is held to be no “right to explanation” in the 
GDPR, one could imagine an equivalent law that encodes such a requirement. 
 91. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)). 
 92. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY:  TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 101 (1995). 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
 94. Id. § 1681g. 
 95. Id. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i. 
 96. 115 CONG. REC. 2410 (1969). 
 97. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012)). 
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making process.98  ECOA prohibits discrimination in credit decisions on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age (for 
adults), receipt of public assistance income, or exercise in good faith of the 
rights guaranteed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.99 
ECOA introduced the adverse action notice requirement.100  When a 
creditor takes an adverse action against an applicant, the creditor must give a 
statement of “specific reasons” for the denial.101  When FCRA later adopted 
a similar requirement, it expanded the notice to cover uses of credit 
information beyond decisions made by creditors, including the use of such 
information in employment decisions.102 
ECOA’s notice requirement was implemented by the Federal Reserve 
Board via Regulation B,103 which mandates that the “statement of reasons . . . 
must be specific and indicate the principal reason(s) for the adverse 
action.”104  The regulation also notes that it is insufficient to “state[] that the 
adverse action was based on the creditor’s internal standards or policies or 
that the applicant . . . failed to achieve a qualifying score on the creditor’s 
credit scoring system.”105  An appendix to Regulation B offers a sample 
notification form designed to satisfy both the rule’s and FCRA’s notification 
requirements.  Sample Form 1 offers twenty-four reason codes, including 
such varied explanations as “no credit file,” “length of employment,” or 
“income insufficient for amount of credit requested.”106  Though it is not 
 
 98. Id. § 502, 88 Stat. at 1521 (noting that the purpose of the legislation is to ensure credit 
is extended fairly, impartially, and without regard to certain protected classes). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012). 
 100. Id. § 1691(d)(2)(B); Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s 
Specificity Requirement:  Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 73, 
82 (1980) (“For the first time, federal legislation afforded rejected credit applicants an 
automatic right to discover why adverse action was taken.”). 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)–(3). 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2012). 
 103. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1002.1–.16 (2018). 
 104. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (2018). 
 105. Id. 
 106. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, app. C (2018).  The form’s listed options are: 
__Credit application incomplete 
__Insufficient number of credit references provided 
__Unacceptable type of credit references provided 
__Unable to verify credit references 
__Temporary or irregular employment 
__Unable to verify employment 
__Length of employment 
__Income insufficient for amount of credit requested 
__Excessive obligations in relation to income 
__Unable to verify income 
__Length of residence 
__Temporary residence 
__Unable to verify residence 
__No credit file 
__Limited credit experience 
__Poor credit performance with us 
__Delinquent past or present credit obligations with others 
__Collection action or judgment 
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necessary to use the form, most creditors tend to report reasons contained on 
that form because there is a safe harbor for “proper use” of the form.107 
Adverse action notices aim to serve three purposes:  (1) to alert a consumer 
that an adverse action has occurred;108 (2) to educate the consumer about how 
such a result could be changed in the future;109 and (3) to prevent 
discrimination.110  As the rest of this section will show, these are commonly 
cited reasons for relying on explanations as a means of regulation as a general 
matter.  The first rationale, consumer awareness, is straightforward enough.  
It is a basic requirement of any information-regulation regime that consumers 
be aware of systems using their information.111  But the relationship between 
adverse action notices and the other two rationales—consumer education and 
antidiscrimination—requires further exploration. 
Adverse action notices can be helpful for consumer education.  As Winnie 
Taylor pointed out shortly after the passage of ECOA, some reasons—“no 
credit file” and “unable to verify income”—are self-explanatory and would 
allow a consumer to take appropriate actions to adjust.112  Conversely, some 
explanations, such as “length of employment” and home ownership, are 
harder to understand or act on.113  This suggests that an explanation of a 
specific decision may be informative, but it may not reveal an obvious path 
to an alternative outcome. 
There are also situations in which it may not even be informative.  Taylor 
imagined a hypothetical additive credit-scoring system with eight different 
features—including whether an applicant owns or rents, whether he has a 
home phone, and what type of occupation he has, among other things—each 
assigned different point values.114  In a system like that, someone who comes 
up one point short could find himself with every factor listed as a “principal 
 
__Garnishment or attachment 
__Foreclosure or repossession 
__Bankruptcy 
__Number of recent inquiries on credit bureau report 
__Value or type of collateral not sufficient 
__Other, specify:  _________ 
Id. 
 107. Equal Credit Opportunity, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,590, 41,592 (July 15, 2011) (“A creditor 
receives a safe harbor for compliance with Regulation B for proper use of the model forms.”). 
 108. See S. REP. NO. 94-589, at 4 (1976). 
 109. Id. (“[R]ejected credit applicants will now be able to learn where and how their credit 
status is deficient and this information should have a pervasive and valuable educational 
benefit.  Instead of being told only that they do not meet a particular creditor’s standards, 
consumers particularly should benefit from knowing, for example, that the reason for the 
denial is their short residence in the area, or their recent change of employment, or their already 
over-extended financial situation.”). 
 110. Id. (“The requirement that creditors give reasons for adverse action is . . . a strong and 
necessary adjunct to the antidiscrimination purpose of the legislation, for only if creditors 
know they must explain their decisions will they effectively be discouraged from 
discriminatory practices.”). 
 111. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 112. Taylor, supra note 100, at 97. 
 113. Id. at 95. 
 114. Id. at 105–07. 
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reason”115 for the denial.  In one sense, this must be correct because a positive 
change in any factor at all would change the outcome.  In another sense, 
however, choosing arbitrarily among equivalently valid reasons runs counter 
to the instruction to give specific and actionable notice. 
Taylor also described a real system from that era, complex in all the 
various ways described in Part I—nonlinear, nonmonotonic, discontinuous, 
and multidimensional: 
[A]pplicants who have lived at their present address for less than six months 
are awarded 39 points, a level which they could not reach again until they 
had maintained the same residence for seven and one-half years.  
Furthermore, applicants who have been residents for between six months 
and 1 year 5 months (30 points) are considered more creditworthy than 
those who have been residents for between 1 and 1/2 years and 3 years 5 
months (27 points).116 
If the creditor tried to explain these rules simply, it would leave information 
out, but if the creditor were to explain in complete detail, it would likely 
overwhelm a credit applicant.  This is an equivalent problem to simply 
disclosing how a model works under the banner of transparency; access to 
the model is not the same as understanding.117 
The Federal Reserve Board recognized this problem, observing that, 
although all the principal reasons must be disclosed, “disclosure of more than 
four reasons is not likely to be helpful to the applicant.”118  The difficulty is 
that there will be situations where complexity cannot be avoided in a faithful 
representation of the scoring system, and listing factors alone will fail to 
accurately explain the decision, especially when the list is limited to four.119  
It is worth noting that modern credit systems appear not to be based on such 
complex models,120 likely due to the very existence of FCRA and ECOA.  
Credit predictions tend to rely on features that bear an intuitive relationship 
to default, such as past payment history.121  But the point is more general:  
 
 115. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 116. Taylor, supra note 100, at 123. 
 117. See Ananny & Crawford, supra note 24, at 979 (“Transparency can intentionally 
occlude.”). 
 118. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 supp. I, para. 9(b)(2) (2018).  FCRA later codified the same 
limitation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(1)(C) (2012). 
 119. The document also states that the “specific reasons . . . must relate to and accurately 
describe the factors actually considered or scored by a creditor . . . .  A creditor need not 
describe how or why a factor adversely affected an applicant . . . .  If a creditor bases the . . . 
adverse action on a credit scoring system, the reasons disclosed must relate only to those 
factors actually scored in the system.” 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 supp. I, para. 9(b)(2). 
 120. Patrick Hall, Wen Phan & SriSatish Ambati, Ideas on Interpreting Machine Learning, 
O’REILLY (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/ideas-on-interpreting-machine-
learning [https://perma.cc/57XK-NU7G]. 
 121. Carol A. Evans, Keeping Fintech Fair:  Thinking About Fair Lending and UDAP 
Risks, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK (Fed. Res. Sys., Phila., Pa.), 2017, at 4–5, 
https://consumercomplianceoutlook.org/assets/2017/second-issue/ccoi22017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/52XP-PQN4]; see also ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE:  NEW DATA, 
UNDERWRITING, AND MARKETING IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE 21 (2014), 
https://www.teamupturn.com/static/files/Knowing_the_Score_Oct_2014_v1_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FCY-4K2K]. 
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approaches based on giving specific reasons for outcomes can fail where the 
system is too complex. 
The adverse action notice fares worse as an antidiscrimination measure.  
By 1974, forcing hidden intentions into the open was a common technique 
for addressing discrimination.122  Just one year before ECOA’s passage, 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green123 laid out the canonical Title VII 
burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment, which requires a 
defendant to rebut a prima facie case of employment discrimination with a 
nondiscriminatory reason and gives plaintiffs a chance to prove that the 
proffered reason is pretextual.124  Just two years before that, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.125 recognized disparate impact 
doctrine.126  Disparate impact attributes liability for a facially neutral 
decision that has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class unless 
the decision maker can provide a legitimate business reason for the decision 
and no equally effective but less discriminatory alternative exists.127  Its 
initial purpose was arguably to smoke out intentional discrimination where 
intent was hidden.128  Thus, ECOA pursued the same goal—to prevent 
discrimination by forcing decision-making into the open. 
While forcing stated reasons into the open captures the most egregious 
forms of intentional discrimination, it does not capture much else.  Although, 
in some cases, Regulation B bars collection of protected-class information,129 
race, gender, and other features can be reliably inferred from sufficiently rich 
datasets.130  Should creditors seek to discriminate intentionally by 
considering membership in a protected class, they would have to 
affirmatively lie about such behavior lest they reveal obvious wrongdoing.  
This form of intentional discrimination is thus addressed by disclosure.  
Should creditors rely on known proxies for membership in a protected class, 
however, while they would have to withhold the true relevance of these 
features in predicting creditworthiness, they could cite them honestly as 
reasons for the adverse action.  The notice requirement therefore does not 
place meaningful constraints on creditors, nor does it create additional or 
 
 122. See Olatunde C. A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REV. 125, 140 (2014) (tracing the history of agency use of disparate impact analysis to 
address latent discrimination). 
 123. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 124. Id. at 805. The Supreme Court later found that a jury may presume that if all the 
employer had was pretext, that itself is evidence of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the 
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together 
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”). 
 125. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 126. Id. at 431. 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012).  This description ignores the word “refuse” in 
the statute, but is probably the more common reading. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 709. 
 128. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:  Round Three, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 494, 518–21 (2003) (discussing the “evidentiary dragnet” theory of disparate impact). 
 129. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5 (2018). 
 130. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 692. 
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unique liability beyond that present in the antidiscrimination provisions of 
the rest of the regulation.131 
More importantly, creditors using quantitative methods that do not 
expressly consider protected-class membership are likely not engaged in 
intentional discrimination, yet the scoring systems might very well evince a 
disparate impact.  While ECOA does not expressly provide for a disparate 
impact theory of discrimination, case law suggests that it is very likely 
available.132 
The adverse action notice approach has two specific shortcomings for a 
disparate impact case.  First, when reviewing such a notice, the consumer 
only has access to her own specific outcome.  Her single point of reference 
does not provide any understanding of the frequency of denials along 
protected-class lines, so she cannot observe disparate impact.  Absent 
understanding of the logic of the system—for example, how different inputs 
are weighted—she cannot even look at the decision-making to try to guess 
whether it is discriminatory; the notice simply provides no basis to bring a 
suit. 
Second, disparate impact has a different relationship to reasons behind 
decisions than does intentional discrimination.  While for intentional 
discrimination, a consumer only needs to know that the decision was not 
made for an improper reason, knowing the specific reasons for which it was 
made becomes important for a disparate impact case.133  That is to say, it is 
not only important to understand how a statistical system converts inputs to 
specific outputs, but also why the system was set up that way. 
As discussed in Part I, one avenue to ensure the existence of an explanation 
of why the rules are the way they are is to require that the rules be based on 
intuitive relationships between input and output variables.  This is the 
approach advocated by several scholars, particularly those focused on 
discrimination.134  As is discussed in Part IV, it is not the only way, but this 
inability to engage with the normative purposes of the statute is a clear 
shortcoming of explanations based solely on the outcome of a single case, 
which provides neither the logic of the system nor any information about its 
normative elements. 
 
 131. John H. Matheson, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act:  A Functional Failure, 21 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371, 388 (1984). 
 132. The Supreme Court has not ruled that it is available, but most circuit courts that have 
considered it have permitted it. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the 
Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 193 (2016) (citing Golden v. City of Columbus, 
404 F.3d 950, 963 (6th Cir. 2005)).  In addition, the Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that disparate 
impact theory was cognizable in the Fair Housing Act, which also does not expressly provide 
for it. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2518 (2015). 
 133. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 702. 
 134. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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2.  GDPR 
In 2016, the European Union (EU) passed the GDPR, which took effect on 
May 25, 2018, and replaced the 1995 Data Protection Directive.135  Both laws 
regulate automated decision-making,136 but in the twenty-three years of the 
Directive’s existence, little jurisprudence developed around that particular 
aspect of the law.  The GDPR has created renewed interest in these 
provisions.137 
The GDPR’s discussion of automated decisions is contained in Articles 
22, 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h).  Article 22 is the primary provision and 
states, in relevant part, the following: 
1.  The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal 
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision: 
(a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the 
data subject and a data controller; 
(b) . . . 
(c) is based on the data subject’s explicit consent. 
3.  In the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data 
controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point 
of view and to contest the decision.138 
Articles 13–15 spell out a data subject’s right to be informed about the 
information that data controllers have about her.139  Articles 13 and 14 
describe the obligations of data controllers to affirmatively notify data 
subjects about the uses of their information,140 and Article 15 delineates the 
access rights that data subjects have to information about how their own data 
is used.141  All three demand that the following information be available to 
data subjects:  “the existence of automated decision-making, including 
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, 
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance 
and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.”142 
 
 135. GDPR, supra note 12, art. 99. 
 136. Id. art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision 
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”); Data Protection 
Directive, supra note 84, art. 15. 
 137. Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions 
Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW 77, 80–81 (2017). 
 138. GDPR, supra note 12, art. 22.  Article 22(4) is omitted because it is not relevant to 
this discussion. 
 139. Wachter et al., supra note 23, at 89. 
 140. See GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 13–14. 
 141. See id. art. 15. 
 142. Id. arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 
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Since passage of the GDPR, scholars have debated whether these 
requirements amount to a “right to explanation.”143  As one of us has argued 
elsewhere, that debate has been bogged down in proxy battles over what the 
phrase “right to explanation” means, but no matter whether one calls it a right 
to explanation, requiring that data subjects have meaningful information 
about the logic must mean something related to explanation.144  Importantly 
for this discussion, the Regulation demands that the “meaningful 
information” must be about the logic of the decisions.145  As we defined it in 
Part I, a model is inscrutable when it defies practical inspection and resists 
comprehension.  An explanation of the logic therefore appears to precisely 
target inscrutability.  The most important aspect of this type of explanation 
is that it is concerned with the operation of the model in general, rather than 
as it pertains to a particular outcome. 
The particular type of explanation required by the GDPR will depend on 
the legal standards developed in the EU by the authorities charged with 
interpreting that law.  The overall purposes of the GDPR are much broader 
than FCRA and ECOA.  The EU treats data protection as a fundamental 
right,146 and the GDPR seeks to vindicate the following principles with 
respect to personal data:  lawfulness, fairness, and transparency; purpose 
limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and 
confidentiality; and accountability.147  Several of these principles are a 
restatement of the FIPs that have shaped privacy policy for decades.148  
 
 143. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 17–24), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3196985 [https://perma.cc/92GH-W6HV] (reviewing the literature); 
see also Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm?  Why a “Right to an 
Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
18, 44 (2017) (arguing that even if a right to explanation exists, it may not be useful); 
Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-
Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 243, 245, 
250 (2017) (arguing that the GDPR creates a right to “legibility” that combines transparency 
and comprehensibility); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 137 (arguing that a right to 
explanation can be derived as a necessary precursor to the right to contest the decision); Selbst 
& Powles, supra note 90 (arguing that a right to meaningful information is a right to 
explanation); Sandra Wachter et al., Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black 
Box:  Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH 841 (2018) (arguing that a 
legal right to explanations of automated decisions does not exist); Wachter et al., supra note 
23 (arguing that there is no legal right to explanation of specific automated decisions); 
Goodman & Flaxman, supra note 20, at 2 (arguing that a right to explanation exists); Maja 
Brkan, Do Algorithms Rule the World?  Algorithmic Decision-Making and Data Protection 
in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond 15 (Aug. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124901 [https://perma.cc/C9PN-4PL6] 
(arguing that “information about the logic involved” and the right to contest decisions imply 
a right to explanation). 
 144. See Selbst & Powles, supra note 90, at 233. 
 145. GDPR, supra note 12, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 
 146. Id. art. 1. 
 147. Id. art. 5. 
 148. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process:  Toward a Framework 
to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 106–07 (2014).  While different 
lists of FIPs conflict, one prominent example is the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development’s (OECD) list:  Collection Limitation Principle, Data Quality Principle, 
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Considered as a whole, they begin to sound like the general idea of due 
process in all its expansiveness. 
Satisfying this requirement may in some cases involve disclosing the full 
set of rules behind all decision-making—that is, the entire model.149  But in 
some cases, it will not involve such radical disclosure.  Depending on the 
specific goals at issue, the types of rules disclosed can be narrower, or the 
explanation can perhaps be met interactively by providing data subjects with 
the tools to examine how changes in their information relate to changes in 
outcome.  One of us has argued that the GDPR’s meaningful information 
requirement applies “to the data subject herself”150 and “should be 
interpreted functionally and flexibly,” and that the legal standard should be 
that the explanation “at a minimum, enable[s] a data subject to exercise his 
or her rights under the GDPR and human rights law.”151 
Although the GDPR’s goals are broader than those of ECOA and FCRA, 
evaluating the ability of logic-based explanations to vindicate the goals of 
those statutes can demonstrate how explanations of the logic of decision-
making can improve upon the shortcomings of the outcome-based approach.  
The three reasons were awareness, consumer (here, data subject) education, 
and antidiscrimination.152  Like in the credit domain, awareness is 
straightforward and encapsulated by the requirement that a data subject be 
made aware of the “existence” of automated decision-making.  The other two 
rationales operate differently when logic-based explanations are provided. 
Data subject education becomes more straightforward as a legal matter, if 
not a technical one.  Absent inscrutability, a data subject would be told the 
rules of the model and would be able to comprehend his situation and how to 
achieve any particular outcome.  This solves both problems that Taylor 
identified.153  Consider the system where, after the creditor totaled the point 
values from eight factors, a person missed on her credit application by one 
point.  While it might be impossible to point to four factors that were 
“principal reasons,” the explanation of the logic—what the eight factors 
were, that they were all assigned point values, and that the hypothetical 
applicant just missed by a point—would be much more useful to that 
 
Purpose Specification Principle, Use Limitation Principle, Security Safeguards Principle, 
Openness Principle, Individual Participation Principle, and Accountability Principle. Org. for 
Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The OECD Privacy Framework, at 14–15 (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWM2-
EUD4]. 
 149. The guidelines issued by the Article 29 Working Party, a body tasked with giving 
official interpretations of EU law, states that the full model is not required. See Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and 
Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 25, WP 251 (Feb. 6, 2018) (“The GDPR 
requires the controller to provide meaningful information about the logic involved, not 
necessarily a complex explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm.”).  
As a matter of positive law, then, this is likely to be the outcome, but in some cases it may fall 
short of something actually meaningful to the data subject. 
 150. See Selbst & Powles, supra note 90, at 236. 
 151. Id. at 233. 
 152. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
2018] EXPLAINABLE MACHINES 1109 
particular rejected applicant.154  In Taylor’s real nonlinear, nonmonotonic, 
discontinuous, and multidimensional example, the full complexity can be 
appreciated in the paragraph-long description, where a reason code would in 
many cases be totally unhelpful.  Once machine learning enters the picture, 
and models become more complex, the limits on technical ability to solve 
inscrutability may prevent these explanations from coming to fruition. But at 
least in theory, explanations of the logic are sufficient for data subject 
education. 
Turning to discrimination—which serves as a stand-in for broader 
normative questions about model justification—while logic-based 
explanations do fare better than outcome-based ones, they do not completely 
address the shortcomings.  Any rule that is manifestly objectionable becomes 
visible under logic-based explanations, making them an improvement over 
outcome-only explanations, which shed no light on rules.  This disclosure 
might enable one to speculate if facially neutral rules will nevertheless have 
a disparate impact, based on the different rates at which certain input features 
are held across the population.  But this is ultimately little more than 
guesswork.155  Although there might not be anything about a rule that appears 
likely to generate a disparate impact, it still could.  Alternatively, a set of 
rules could appear objectionable or discriminatory, but ultimately be 
justified.  It will often be impossible to tell without more information, and 
the possibility of happening on a set of rules that lend themselves to intuitive 
normative assessment is only a matter of chance. 
B.  Interpretability in Machine Learning 
The overriding question that has prompted fierce debates about 
explanation and machine learning has been whether machine learning can be 
made to comply with the law.  As discussed in Part I, machine learning poses 
unique challenges for explanation and understanding—and thus challenges 
for meeting the apparent requirements of the law.  Part II.A further 
demonstrated that even meeting the requirements of the law does not 
automatically provide the types of explanations that would be necessary to 
assess whether decisions are well justified.  Nevertheless, addressing the 
potential inscrutability of machine learning models remains a fundamental 
step in meeting this goal. 
As it happens, machine learning has a well-developed toolkit to deal with 
calls for explanation.  There is an extensive literature on “interpretability.”156  
Early research recognized and grappled with the challenge of explaining the 
decisions of machine learning models such that people using these systems 
 
 154. The Article 29 Working Party has, however, suggested that this approach is central to 
the “meaningful information” requirement. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
supra note 149, at 25. 
 155. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 156. See generally, e.g., Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black 
Box Models, 51 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, Aug. 2018, at 1; Lipton, supra note 66. 
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would feel comfortable acting upon them.157  Practitioners and researchers 
have developed a wide variety of strategies and techniques to ensure that they 
can produce interpretable models from data—many of which may be useful 
for complying with existing law, such as FCRA, ECOA, and the GDPR. 
Interpretability has received considerable attention in research and practice 
due to the widely held belief that there is a tension between how well a model 
will perform and how well humans will be able to interpret it.158  This view 
reflects the reasonable idea that models that consider a larger number of 
variables, a larger number of relationships between these variables, and a 
more diverse set of potential relationships is likely to be both more accurate 
and more complex.159  This will certainly be the case when the phenomenon 
that machine learning seeks to model is itself complex.  This intuition 
suggests that practitioners may face a difficult choice:  favor simplicity for 
the sake of interpretability or accept complexity to maximize performance.160 
While such views seem to be widely held,161 over the past decade, methods 
have emerged that attempt to sidestep these difficult choices altogether, 
promising to increase interpretability while retaining performance.162  
Researchers have developed at least three different ways to respond to the 
demand for explanations:  (1) purposefully orchestrating the machine 
learning process such that the resulting model is interpretable;163 
(2) applying special techniques after model creation to approximate the 
model in a more readily intelligible form or identify features that are most 
salient for specific decisions;164 and (3) providing tools that allow people to 
interact with the model and get a sense of its operation.165 
1.  Purposefully Building Interpretable Models 
Practitioners have a number of different levers at their disposal to 
purposefully design simpler models.  First, they may choose to consider only 
a limited set of all possible variables.166  By limiting the analysis to a smaller 
set of variables, the total number of relationships uncovered in the learning 
process might be sufficiently limited to be intelligible to a human.167  It is 
 
 157. van Melle et al., supra note 85, at 302. 
 158. See, e.g., Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling:  The Two Cultures, 16 STAT. SCI. 199, 
206 (2001); Lou et al., supra note 54, at 150. 
 159. See Breiman, supra note 158, at 208. 
 160. See generally id. 
 161. See DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT:  
EXPLAINABLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (XAI) (2016), https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/ 
DARPA-BAA-16-53.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FZV-TZGA]; Henrik Brink & Joshua Bloom, 
Overcoming the Barriers to Production-Ready Machine-Learning Workflows, STRATA (Feb. 
11, 2014), https://conferences.oreilly.com/strata/strata2014/public/schedule/detail/32314 
[https://perma.cc/2GBV-2QRR]. 
 162. For a recent survey, see Michael Gleicher, A Framework for Considering 
Comprehensibility in Modeling, 4 BIG DATA 75 (2016). 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 81–82. 
 164. See, e.g., id. at 82–83. 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 83. 
 166. See id. at 81. 
 167. Zeng et al., supra note 82, at 690–91. 
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very likely that a model with five features, for example, will be more 
interpretable than a model with five hundred. 
Second, practitioners might elect to use a learning method that outputs a 
model that can be more easily parsed than the output of other learning 
methods.168  For example, decision tree algorithms are perceived as likely to 
produce interpretable models because they learn nested rules that can be 
represented visually as a tree with subdividing branches.  To understand how 
the model would process any particular case, practitioners need only walk 
through the relevant branches of the tree; to understand the model overall, 
practitioners can explore all the branches to develop a sense of how the model 
would determine all possible cases. 
The experience of applying machine learning to real-world problems has 
led to common beliefs among practitioners about the relative interpretability 
of models that result from different learning methods and how well they 
perform.  Conventional wisdom suggests that there is a trade-off between 
interpretability and accuracy.169  Methods like linear regression170 generate 
models perceived as highly interpretable, but relatively low performing, 
while methods like deep learning171 result in high-performing models that 
are exceedingly difficult to interpret.172  While researchers have pointed out 
that such comparisons do not rest on a rigorous definition of interpretability 
or empirical studies,173 such beliefs routinely guide practitioners’ decisions 
when applying machine learning to different kinds of problems.174 
Another method is to set the parameters of the learning process to ensure 
that the resulting model is not so complex that it defies human 
comprehension.  For example, even decision trees will become unwieldy for 
humans if they involve an exceedingly large number of branches and 
leaves.175  Practitioners routinely set an upper bound on the number of leaves 
to constrain the complexity of the model.176  For decades, practitioners in 
regulated industries like credit and insurance have purposefully limited 
themselves to a relatively small set of features and less sophisticated learning 
methods.177  In so doing, they have been able to generate models that lend 
themselves to sensible explanation, but they may have forgone the increased 
accuracy that would result from a richer and more advanced analysis.178 
 
 168. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 51, at 688–95. 
 169. See, e.g., Breiman, supra note 158, at 208. 
 170. See Regression, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2014). 
 171. See generally Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep Learning in Neural Networks:  An 
Overview, 61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85 (2015) (providing an explanation of deep learning in 
artificial intelligence). 
 172. Breiman, supra note 158, at 206. 
 173. Alex A. Freitas, Comprehensible Classification Models—a Position Paper, 
15 SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS, June 2013, at 1. 
 174. See Lipton, supra note 66, at 99. 
 175. Id. at 98. 
 176. See id. at 99. 
 177. Hall et al., supra note 120. 
 178. Id. 
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Linear models remain common in industry because they allow companies 
to much more readily comply with the law.179  When they involve a 
sufficiently small set of features, linear models are concise enough for a 
human to grasp the relevant statistical relationships and to simulate different 
scenarios.180  They are simple enough that a full description of the model 
may amount to the kind of meaningful information about the logic of 
automated decisions required by the GDPR.  At the same time, linear models 
also immediately highlight the relative importance of different features by 
assigning a specific numerical weight to each feature, which allows 
companies to quickly extract the principal factors for an adverse action notice 
under ECOA. 
Beyond the choice of features, learning method, or learning parameters, 
there are techniques that can make simplicity an additional and explicit 
optimization criterion in the learning process.  The most common such 
method is regularization.181  Much like setting an upper limit on the number 
of branches in a decision tree, regularization allows the learning process to 
factor in model complexity by assigning a cost to excess complexity.182  In 
doing so, model simplicity becomes an additional objective alongside model 
performance, and the learning process can be set up to find the optimal trade-
off between these sometimes-competing objectives.183 
Finally, the learning process can also be constrained such that all features 
exhibit monotonicity.184  Monotonicity constraints are widespread in credit 
scoring because they make it easier to reason about how scores will change 
when the value of specific variables change, thereby allowing creditors to 
automate the process of generating the reason codes required by FCRA and 
ECOA.185  As a result of these legal requirements, creditors and other data-
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 180. See Lipton, supra note 66, at 98. 
 181. See Gleicher, supra note 162, at 81–82. 
 182. See id. at 81.  One commonly used version of this method is Lasso. See generally 
Robert Tibshirani, Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso, 58 J. ROYAL STAT. 
SOC’Y 267 (1996).  It was originally designed to increase accuracy by avoiding overfitting, 
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learns patterns that are peculiar to the training data and not representative of real-world 
patterns. See id. at 267.  Machine learning is only effective in practice when it successfully 
identifies robust patterns while also ignoring patterns that are specific to the training data. See 
David J. Hand, Classifier Technology and the Illusion of Progress, 21 STAT. SCI. 1, 2 (2006).  
Lasso increases accuracy by forcing the learning process to ignore relationships that are 
relatively weak, and therefore more likely to be artifacts of the training data. See Tibshirani, 
supra, at 268.  Because Lasso works by strategically removing unnecessary features, the 
technique can simultaneously improve interpretability (by reducing complexity) in many real-
world applications and increase performance (by avoiding overfitting). See id. at 267.  As 
such, improved interpretability need not always decrease performance.  But where potential 
overfitting is not a danger, regularization methods may result in degradations in performance. 
See Gleicher, supra note 162, at 81–82. 
 183. Gleicher, supra note 162, at 81. 
 184. Recall that monotonicity implies that an increase in an input variable can only result 
in either an increase or decrease in the output; it can never change from one to the other. See 
supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 185. See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 120.  Monotonicity allows creditors to rank order 
variables according to how much the value of each variable in an applicant’s file differs from 
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driven decision makers often have incentives to ensure their models are 
interpretable by design. 
2.  Post Hoc Methods 
There exists an entirely different set of techniques for improved 
interpretability that does not place any constraints on the model-building 
process.  Instead, these techniques begin with models learned with more 
complex methods and attempt to approximate them with simpler and more 
readily interpretable methods.  Most methods in this camp generate what can 
be understood as a model of the model. 
These methods attempt to overcome the fact that simpler learning methods 
cannot always reliably discover as many useful relationships in the data.  For 
example, the learning process involved in decision trees is what is known as 
a “greedy algorithm.”186  Once the learning process introduces a particular 
branch, the method does not permit walking back up the branch.187  
Therefore, relationships between items on two different branches will not be 
discovered.188  Despite lacking the same limitation, more complex learning 
methods, such as deep learning, do not result in models as interpretable as 
decision trees.  Nonetheless, rules that cannot be learned with simpler 
methods can often be represented effectively by simpler models.189  
Techniques like rule extraction190 allow simple models to “cheat” because 
the answers that simpler learning methods would otherwise miss are known 
ahead of time.191 
This approach can be costly and it does not have universal success.192  
Despite practitioners’ best efforts, replicating the performance of more 
complex models in a simple enough form might not be possible where the 
phenomena are particularly complex.  For example, using a decision tree to 
approximate a model developed with deep learning might require too large a 
number of branches and leaves to be understandable in practice.193 
When these methods work well, they ensure that the entire set of 
relationships learned by the model can be expressed concisely, without 
 
the corresponding value of each variable for the ideal customer—the top four variables can 
function as reason codes. Id. 
 186. STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:  A MODERN APPROACH 
92–93 (3d ed. 2014). 
 187. Id. 
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giving up much performance.  Accordingly, they serve a similar role to the 
interpretability-driven design constraints discussed above.194  When they do 
not work as well, arriving at an interpretable model might necessitate 
sacrificing some of the performance gained by using the more complex 
model.  But even when these methods involve a notable loss in performance, 
the resulting models frequently perform far better than simple methods 
alone.195 
Other tools have also emerged that attack the problem of interpretability 
from a different direction.  Rather than attempting to ensure that machine 
learning generates an intelligible model overall, these new tools furnish more 
limited explanations that only account for the relative importance of different 
features in particular outcomes—similar to the reason codes required by 
FCRA and ECOA.196  At a high level, most of these methods adopt a similar 
approach:  they attempt to establish the importance of any feature to a 
particular decision by iteratively varying the value of that feature while 
holding the value of other features constant.197 
These tools seem well suited for the task set by ECOA, FCRA, or other 
possible outcome-oriented approaches:  explaining the principal reasons that 
account for the specific adverse decision.198  As we further discuss in the next 
section, there are several reasonable ways to explain the same specific 
outcome.  These methods are useful for two of the most common:  
(1) determining the relative contribution of different features, or 
(2) identifying the features whose values would have to change the most to 
change the outcome.199  One could imagine applying these methods to 
models that consider an enormous range of features and map out an 
exceedingly complex set of relationships.  While such methods will never 
make these relationships completely sensible to a human, they can provide a 
list of reasons that might help provide reason codes for a specific decision. 
 
 194. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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Unfortunately, these methods may not work well in cases where models 
take a much larger set of features into account.  Should many features each 
contribute a small amount to a particular determination, listing each feature 
in an explanation is not likely to be helpful.  This is the machine learning 
version of Taylor’s hypothetical eight-factor credit example.200  The number 
of features identified as influential might be sufficiently large that the 
explanation would simply reproduce the problem of inscrutability that it aims 
to address.  The only alternative in these cases—arbitrarily listing fewer 
reasons than the correct number—is also unsatisfying when all features are 
equivalently, or nearly equivalently, important.  As it happens, post hoc 
explanations for credit and other similarly important decisions are likely to 
be most attractive precisely when they do not seem to work well—that is, 
when the only way to achieve a certain level of performance is to vastly 
expand the range of features under consideration. 
These methods are also unlikely to generate explanations that satisfy logic-
like approaches like the GDPR.  Indeed, such techniques pose a unique 
danger of misleading people into believing that the reasons that account for 
specific decisions must also apply in the same way for others—that the 
reasons for a specific decision illustrate a general rule.  Understandably, 
humans tend to extrapolate from explanations of specific decisions to similar 
cases, but the model—especially a complex one—may have a very different 
basis for identifying similar-seeming cases.201  These methods offer 
explanations that apply only to the case at hand and cannot be extrapolated 
to decisions based on other input data.202 
3.  Interactive Approaches 
One final set of approaches is interactive rather than explanatory.  
Practitioners can allow people to get a feel for their models by producing 
interactive interfaces that resemble the methods described in the previous 
sections.  This can take two quite different forms.  One is the type proposed 
by Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale203 and implemented, for example, by 
Credit Karma.204  Beginning with a person’s baseline credit information, 
Credit Karma offers a menu of potential changes, such as opening new credit 
cards, obtaining a new loan, or going into foreclosure.205  A person using the 
interface can see how each action would affect his credit score.206  This does 
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not amount to a full explanation because a person at a different starting point 
could make similar moves with different outcomes, but it gives the individual 
user a partial functional feel for the logic of the system as it applies to him 
specifically. 
The second is more complicated and abstract.  Mireille Hildebrandt has 
proposed something she terms “transparency-enhancing technologies.”207  
Such technologies would implement an interface that would allow people to 
simultaneously adjust the value of multiple features in a model with the goal 
of providing a loose sense of the relationship between these features and a 
specific outcome, as well as the connection between the features 
themselves.208  The goal of this type of technology is not to tell the user what 
changes in his results specifically but to allow him to get a feel from an 
arbitrary starting point.209 
Where models are simple enough, these approaches seem to achieve the 
educational goals of both ECOA and the GDPR by allowing data subjects to 
gain an intuitive feel for the system.  Ironically, this would be accomplished 
by complying with neither law because a person will not know a specific 
reason for denial or have an account of a model’s logic after playing with it, 
even if they feel that they understand the model better afterward. 
While regulators have expressed interest in this idea,210 however, it poses 
a technical challenge.  The statistical relationships at work in these models 
may be sufficiently complex that no consistent rule may become evident by 
tinkering with adjustable sliders.  Models might involve a very large number 
of inputs with complex and shifting interdependencies such that even the 
most systematic tinkering would generate outcomes that would be difficult 
for a person to explain in a principled way. 
One danger of this approach, then, is that it could do more to placate than 
elucidate.  People could try to make sense of variations in the observed 
outputs by favoring the simplest possible explanation that accounts for the 
limited set of examples generated by playing with the system.  Such an 
explanation is likely to take the form of a rule that incorrectly assigns a small 
set of specific variables unique significance and treats their effect on the 
outcome as linear, monotonic, and independent.  Thus, for already simple 
models that can be explained, interactive approaches may be useful for 
giving people a feel without disclosing the algorithm, but for truly inscrutable 
systems, they could well be dangerous. 
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*          *          * 
Remarkably, the techniques available within machine learning for 
ensuring interpretability correspond well to the different types of explanation 
required by existing law.  There are, on the one hand, varied strategies and 
techniques available to practitioners that can deliver models whose inner 
workings can be expressed succinctly and sensibly to a human observer, 
whether an expert (e.g., a regulator) or lay person (e.g., an affected 
consumer).  Laws like the GDPR that seek logic-like explanations would be 
well served by these methods.  On the other hand, outcome-focused laws like 
ECOA that care only about principal reasons—and not the set of rules that 
govern all decisions—have an obvious partner in tools that furnish post hoc 
accounts of the factors that influenced any particular determination. 
Where they succeed, these methods can be used to meet the demands of 
regulatory regimes that demand outcome- and logic-like explanations.  Both 
techniques have their limitations, however.  If highly sophisticated machine 
learning tools continue to be used, interpretability may be difficult to achieve 
in some instances, especially when the phenomena at issue are themselves 
complex.  Post hoc accounts that list the factors most relevant to a specific 
decision may not work well when the number of relevant factors grows 
beyond a handful—a situation that is most likely to occur when such methods 
would be most attractive. 
Notably, neither the techniques nor the laws go beyond describing the 
operation of the model.  Though they may help to explain why a decision was 
reached or how decisions are made, they cannot address why decisions 
happen to be made that way.  As a result, standard approaches to explanation 
might not help determine whether the particular way of making decisions is 
normatively justified. 
III.  FROM EXPLANATION TO INTUITION 
So far, the majority of discourse around understanding machine learning 
models has seen the proper task as opening the black box and explaining what 
is inside.211  Where Part II.A discussed legal requirements and Part II.B 
discussed technical approaches, here we discuss the motivations for both.  
Based on a review of the literature, scholars, technologists, and policymakers 
seem to have three different beliefs about the value of opening the black 
box.212  The first is a fundamental question of autonomy, dignity, and 
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personhood.  The second is a more instrumental value:  educating the subjects 
of automated decisions about how to achieve different results.  The third is a 
more normative question—the idea that explaining the model will allow 
people to debate whether the model’s rules are justifiable. 
The black-box-only approach is limited for the purposes of justifying 
decision-making.  The first two beliefs are not about justifying decisions at 
all, and therefore serve a different purpose.  The third is explicitly about 
justification, so our critique is directed not at its intent, but its operation.  For 
those concerned with the justification for decision-making, the goal of 
explanation should be to find a way to bring intuition to bear in deciding 
whether the model is well justified.  This Part explains both the power and 
limitations of such an approach. 
A.  The Value of Opening the Black Box 
This Part identifies and elaborates the three rationales that apparently 
underlie most of the popular and scholarly calls for explanation. 
1.  Explanation as Inherent Good 
There are several reasons to view explanation as a good unto itself, and 
perhaps a necessary part of a system constrained by law, including a respect 
for autonomy, dignity, and personhood.213  There is a fundamental difference 
between wanting an explanation for its own sake and wanting an explanation 
for the purpose of vindicating certain specific empowerment or 
accountability goals.  Fears about a system that lacks explanation are visceral.  
This fear is best exemplified in popular consciousness by Franz Kafka’s The 
Trial,214 a story about a faceless bureaucracy that makes consequential 
decisions without input or understanding from those affected.215 
This concern certainly motivates some lawmakers and scholars.  In his 
article, “Privacy and Power,” Daniel Solove refers to this as a 
“dehumanizing” state of affairs characterized by the “powerlessness and 
vulnerability created by people’s lack of any meaningful form of 
participation” in the decision.216  David Luban, Alan Strudler, and David 
Wasserman argue that “one central aspect of the common good”—which 
they argue forms the basis of law’s legitimacy—“lies in what we might call 
the moral intelligibility of our lives” and that the “horror of the bureaucratic 
process lies not in officials’ mechanical adherence to duty, but rather in the 
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individual’s ignorance of what the fulfillment of his or her duty may 
entail.”217  The concerns of dignity and personhood certainly motivate the 
data protection regime in Europe,218 if less directly the law in the United 
States.219 
We lack the space (and the expertise) to do proper justice to the 
personhood argument for explanation.  Accordingly, our goal here is to flag 
it and set it aside as a concern parallel to our broader concerns about enabling 
justifications for automated decisions. 
To the extent that the personhood rationale can be converted to a more 
actionable legal issue, it is reflected in the concept of “procedural justice,” 
which was most famously championed by Tom Tyler.  Procedural justice is 
the essential quality of a legal system that shows respect for its participants, 
which might entail transparency, consistency, or even politeness.220  Tyler 
and others have shown that people care deeply about procedural justice, to 
the point that they might find a proceeding more tolerable and fair if their 
procedural-justice concerns are satisfied even if they do not obtain their 
preferred outcome in the proceeding.221  Procedural justice, Tyler argues, is 
necessary on a large scale because it allows people to buy into the legal 
system and voluntarily comply with the law, both of which are essential parts 
of a working and legitimate legal system.222  Presumably, to the extent that 
automated decisions can be legally or morally justified, people must accept 
them rather than have them imposed, and as a result, the personhood rationale 
for model explanation also implicates procedural justice. 
Ultimately, that there is inherent value in explanation is clear.  But as a 
practical matter, those concerns are difficult to administer, quantify, and 
compare to other concerns.  Where there are genuine trade-offs between 
explanation and other normative values such as accuracy or fairness, the 
inherent value of explanation neither automatically trumps competing 
considerations nor provides much guidance as to the type of explanation 
required.  Therefore, while inherent value cannot be ignored, other rationales 
remain important. 
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2.  Explanation as Enabling Action 
For others, the purpose of explanation extends to providing actionable 
information about the rendering of decisions, such that affected parties can 
learn if and how they might achieve a different outcome.  Explanations are 
valuable, on this account, because they empower people to effectively 
navigate the decision-making process.  Such beliefs are evident in the adverse 
action notice requirements of credit-scoring regulations,223 but they have 
come to dominate more recent debates about the regulatory function of 
requiring explanations of model-driven decisions more generally. 
Across a series of recent papers, the debate has coalesced around two 
distinct, but related, questions.  The first is whether and when the GDPR 
requires explanations of the logic or outcome of decision-making.  The 
second is how to best explain outcomes in an actionable way. 
The first question, whether to focus on outcome- or logic-based 
explanations, originates with an article by Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, 
and Luciano Floridi.224  These scholars split explanations between “system 
functionality” and “specific decisions”—a distinction functionally similar to 
our outcome- and logic-based framework.225  This mirrors the debate in the 
technical community about the best way to understand the meaning of 
interpretability.  As described in Part II.B, the main split is whether to aim 
for interpretable models or to account for specific decisions.  Drawing 
together the legal and machine learning literature, Lilian Edwards and 
Michael Veale have created a similar, but slightly altered distinction between 
“model-centric” and “subject-centric” explanations.226  While not identical, 
subject-centric explanations are another way to explain specific outcomes to 
individuals.227 
As the discussion has evolved in both the legal and computer science 
scholarship, new work has converged on the belief that explaining specific 
outcomes is the right approach.  The debate has therefore shifted to the 
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second question, which focuses on the many different methods by which 
outcomes can be explained. 
An interdisciplinary working group at the Berkman Klein Center for 
Internet and Society begin by recognizing that explanations are infinitely 
variable in concept, but claim that “[w]hen we talk about an explanation for 
a decision, . . . we generally mean the reasons or justifications for that 
particular outcome, rather than a description of the decision-making process 
in general.”228  They propose three ways to examine a specific decision:  
(1) the main factors in a decision, (2) the minimum change required to switch 
the outcome of a decision, and (3) the explanations for similar cases with 
divergent outcomes or divergent cases with similar outcomes.229  Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell have a still narrower focus, writing about 
counterfactual explanations that represent “the smallest change to the world” 
that would result in a different answer.230  They envision a distance metric 
where, if one were to plot all n features in an n-dimensional space, the 
counterfactual is the shortest “distance” from the data subject’s point in the 
space (defined by the values of the features she possesses) to the surface that 
makes up the outer edge of a desirable outcome.231 
Accordingly, counterfactual explanations are seen as fulfilling the three 
goals of explanations discussed in this Part:  (1) to help an individual 
understand a decision, (2) to enable that individual to take steps to achieve a 
better outcome, and (3) to provide a basis for contesting the decision.232  
When applying the strategy of counterfactual explanations, however, it is 
clear that most of the value comes from the second rationale:  actionable 
explanations.  Wachter and colleagues assert that counterfactual explanations 
are an improvement over the existing requirements of the GDPR because, as 
a matter of positive law, the Regulation requires almost nothing except a 
“meaningful overview,” which can be encapsulated via pictorial “icons” 
depicting the type of data processing in question.233  Counterfactual 
explanations, in contrast, offer something specific to the data subject and will 
thus be more useful in informing an effective response.  But if their 
interpretation of the law is correct—that the GDPR requires no 
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question. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9 supp. I (2018). 
 232. Wachter et al., supra note 143, at 843. 
 233. Id. at 865. 
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explanation234—then their claim is that counterfactuals offer more than 
literally nothing, which is not saying much.  On contestability, Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, and Russell ultimately concede that to contest a decision, it is 
likely necessary to understand the logic of decision-making rather than to just 
have a counterfactual explanation of a specific decision.235  The real value, 
then, of their intervention and others like it, is to better allow data subjects to 
alter their behavior when a counterfactual suggests that a decision is based 
on alterable characteristics.236 
Empowering people to navigate the algorithms that affect their lives is an 
important goal and has genuine value.  This is a pragmatic response to a 
difficult problem, but it casts the goal of explanations as something quite 
limited:  ensuring people know the rules of the game so they can play it better.  
This approach is not oriented around asking if the basis of decisions is well 
justified; rather it takes decisions as a given and seeks to allow those affected 
by them to avoid or work around bad outcomes.237  Rather than using 
explanations to ask about the justifications for decision-making, this 
approach shifts responsibility for bad outcomes from the designers of 
automated decisions to those affected by them.238 
3.  Explanation as Exposing a Basis for Evaluation 
The final value ascribed to explanation is that it forces the basis of 
decision-making into the open and thus provides a way to question the 
validity and justifiability of making decisions on these grounds.  As Pauline 
Kim has observed: 
 
 234. The positive law debate about the right to explanation is not the subject of this Article, 
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accompanying text for a discussion. 
 235. Wachter et al., supra note 143, at 878.  Their one example where a counterfactual can 
lead to the ability to contest a decision is based on data being inaccurate or missing rather than 
based on the inferences made.  Thus, it is actually the rare situation specifically envisioned by 
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into account.  Because of the deficiencies of the FCRA approach, discussed supra in Part II.A, 
this will not solve the general problem. 
 236. As Berk Ustun and colleagues point out, an explanation generated by counterfactual 
techniques will not necessarily be actionable unless intentionally structured to be so. Berk 
Ustun et al., Actionable Recourse in Linear Classification 2 (Sept. 18, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06514 [https://perma.cc/RPJ4-P4AP]. 
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subjects, and the assumption is that better information will lead to preferable results. See 
generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
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as a matter of individual decision-making that a person can choose to protect rather than 
something that can be affected by others with more power. See, e.g., Roger Ford, Unilateral 
Invasions of Privacy, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1075 (2016). 
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When a model is interpretable, debate may ensue over whether its use 
is justified, but it is at least possible to have a conversation about whether 
relying on the behaviors or attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively 
acceptable.  When a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even 
possible to have the conversation.239 
But what does it mean to have a conversation based on what an interpretable 
model reveals? 
In a seminal study, Rich Caruana and colleagues provide an answer to that 
question.240  They discovered that a model trained to predict complications 
from pneumonia had learned to associate asthma with a reduced risk of 
death.241  To anyone with a passing knowledge of asthma and pneumonia, 
this result was obviously wrong.  The model was trained on clinical data from 
past pneumonia patients, and it turns out that patients who suffer from asthma 
truly did end up with better outcomes.242  What the model missed was that 
these patients regularly monitored their breathing, causing them to go to the 
hospital earlier.243  Then, once at the hospital, they were considered higher 
risk, so they received more immediate and focused treatment.244  Caruana 
and colleagues drew a general lesson from this experience:  to avoid learning 
artifacts in the data, the model should be sufficiently simple that experts can 
inspect the relationships uncovered to determine if they correspond with 
domain knowledge.  Thus, on this account, the purpose of explanation is to 
permit experts to check the model against their intuition. 
This approach assumes that when a model is made intelligible, experts can 
assess whether the relationships uncovered by the model seem appropriate, 
given their background knowledge of the phenomenon being modeled.  This 
was indeed the case for asthma, but this is not the general case.  Often, rather 
than assigning significance to features in a way that is obviously right or 
wrong, a model will uncover a relationship that is simply perceived as 
strange.  For example, if the hospital’s data did not reveal a dependence on 
an asthma diagnosis—which is clearly linked to pneumonia through 
breathing—but rather revealed a dependence on skin cancer, it would be less 
obvious what to make of that fact.  It would be wrong to simply dismiss it as 
an artifact of the data, but it also does not fit with any intuitive story even a 
domain expert could tell. 
Another example of this view of explanation is the approach to 
interpretability known as Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations 
(“LIME”).245  It has generated one of the canonical examples of the value of 
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 245. Ribeiro et al., supra note 197.  This is one of the methods described supra in Part 
II.B.2. 
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interpretability in machine learning.  Marco Ribeiro and colleagues used 
LIME to investigate a deep-learning model trained to distinguish images of 
wolves from huskies.  The authors discovered that the model did not rely 
primarily on the animals’ features, but on whether snow appeared in the 
background of a photo.246 
There are three reasons this is such a compelling example.  First, what 
LIME identified as the distinguishing feature—snow—is legible to humans.  
Second, this feature is obviously not a property of the category “wolf.”  
Third, humans can tell a story about why this mistake occurred:  wolves are 
more likely to be found in an environment with snow on the ground.  
Although this story may not actually be true, the important point is that we 
can convince ourselves it is.247  Like the asthma example, the ability to 
determine that the model has overfit the training data relies on the inherent 
legibility of the relevant feature, the existence of background knowledge 
about that feature, and our ability to use the background knowledge to tell a 
story about why the feature is important.  In this example, the realization 
relies on something closer to common sense than to specialized expertise, but 
the explanation serves the same function—to allow observers to bring their 
intuition to bear in evaluating the model. 
The final examples come from James Grimmelmann and Daniel 
Westreich,248 as well as Kim, whose work was discussed earlier.249  
Grimmelmann and Westreich imagine a scenario in which a model learns to 
distinguish between job applicants on the basis of a feature—musical taste—
that is both correlated with job performance and membership in a protected 
class.250  They further stipulate that job performance varies by class 
membership.251  As they see it, this poses the challenge of determining 
whether the model, by relying on musical tastes, is in fact relying on 
protected-class membership.252 
Grimmelmann and Westreich then argue that if one cannot tell a story 
about why musical taste correlates with job performance, the model must be 
learning something else.253  They propose a default rule that the “something 
else” be considered membership in a protected class unless it can be shown 
 
 246. Ribeiro et al., supra note 197, at 1142–43.  This is a textbook example of overfitting 
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 248. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75. 
 249. Kim, supra note 4. 
 250. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75, at 166–67. 
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 252. The only reason a model would learn to do this is if:  (1) class membership accounts 
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 253. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 75, at 174. 
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otherwise, specifically by the defendant.254  The problem with this reasoning 
is that the model might not be learning protected-class membership, but a 
different latent variable that explains the relationship between musical taste 
and job performance—an unobserved or unknown characteristic that affects 
both musical taste and job performance.  By assuming that it should be 
possible to tell a story about such a variable if it exists, they—as in the 
examples above—fail to account for the possibility of a strange, but 
legitimate, result.  They use the ability to tell a story as a proxy for the 
legitimacy of the decision-making, but that only works if a justification, or 
lack thereof, immediately falls out of the description, as it did in the asthma 
and snow examples. 
Kim uses a real example to make a similar point.  She cites a study stating 
that employees who installed web browsers that did not come with their 
computers stay longer on their job.255  She then speculates that either there is 
an unobserved variable that would explain the relationship or it is “entirely 
coincidental.”256  To Kim, what determines whether the relationship is 
“substantively meaningful” rather than a mere statistical coincidence is 
whether we can successfully tell ourselves such stories.257  Like 
Grimmelmann and Westreich, for Kim, if no such story can be told, and the 
model has a disparate impact, it should be illegal.258  What these examples 
demonstrate is that, whether one seeks to adjudicate model validity or 
normative justifications, intuition actually plays the same role. 
Unlike the first two values of explanation, this approach has the ultimate 
goal of evaluating whether the basis of decision-making is well justified.  It 
does not, however, ask the question:  “Why are these the rules?”  Instead, it 
makes two moves.  The first two examples answered the question, “What are 
the rules?” and expected that intuition will furnish an answer for both why 
the rules are what they are and whether they are justified.  The latter two 
examples instead argued that decisions should be legally restricted to 
intuitive relationships.  Such a restriction short-circuits the need to ask why 
the rules are what they are by guaranteeing up front that an answer will be 
available.259 
 
 254. Id. at 173. 
 255. Kim, supra note 4, at 922. 
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 257. Kim, supra note 4, at 917. 
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 259. This might also explain the frequent turn to causality as a solution.  Restricting the 
model to causal relationships also short-circuits the need to ask the “why” question because 
the causal mechanism is the answer.  Ironically, a causal model need not be intuitive, so it may 
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These two approaches are similar, but differ in the default rule they apply 
to strange cases.  In the case of the two technical examples, the assumption 
is that obviously flawed relationships will present themselves and should be 
overruled; relationships for which there is no intuitive explanation may 
remain.  The two legal examples, by contrast, are more conservative.  They 
presume that obviously correct relationships will show themselves, so that 
everything else should be discarded by default, while allowing for the 
possibility of defeating such a presumption.  Both are forced to rely on 
default rules to handle strange, but potentially legitimate, cases because the 
fundamental reliance on intuition does not give them tools to evaluate these 
cases. 
B.  Evaluating Intuition 
Much of the anxiety around inscrutable models comes from the legal 
world’s demands for justifiable decision-making.  That decisions based on 
machine learning reflect the particular patterns in the training data cannot be 
a sufficient explanation for why a decision is made the way it is.  Evaluating 
whether some basis for decision-making is fair, for example, will require 
tools that go beyond standard technical tests of validity that would already 
have been applied to the model during its development.260  While the law 
gives these tests some credence, reliance on accuracy is not normatively 
adequate with respect to machine learning.261 
For many, the presumed solution is requiring machine learning models to 
be intelligible.262  What the prior discussion demonstrates, though, is that this 
presumption works on a very specific line of reasoning that is based on the 
idea that with enough explanation, we can bring intuition to bear in 
evaluating decision-making.  As Kim observes: 
Even when a model is interpretable, its meaning may not be clear.  Two 
variables may be strongly correlated in the data, but the existence of a 
statistical relationship does not tell us if the variables are causally related, 
or are influenced by some common unobservable factor, or are completely 
unrelated.263 
 
 260. Even among practitioners, the interest in interpretability stems from warranted 
suspicion of the power of validation; there are countless reasons why assessing the likely 
performance of a model against an out-of-sample test set will fail to accurately predict a 
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of decision-making encoded in machine learning models. 
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Her response is to constrain the model to features that bear an intuitive 
relationship to the outcome.264 
This way of thinking originates in disparate impact doctrine, which—
among several ways of describing the requirement—calls for an employment 
test to have a “manifest relationship” to future job performance.265  But there 
is a difference between a manifest relationship of a model to job performance 
and a manifest relationship of a particular feature to job performance.  
Models can be shown to have a manifest relationship to job performance if 
the target variable is manifestly related to job performance and the model is 
statistically valid.  This is true even if none of the individual features are 
manifestly related.266  People who advocate for a nexus between features and 
the outcome are dissatisfied with a purely statistical test and want some other 
basis to subject a model to normative assessment.  Models must be restricted 
to intuitive relationships, the logic goes, so that such a basis will exist. 
Regulatory guidance evinces similar reasoning.  In 2011, the Federal 
Reserve issued formal guidance on model risk management.267  The purpose 
of the document was to expand on prior guidance that was limited to model 
validation.268  The guidance notes that models “may be used incorrectly or 
inappropriately” and that banks need diverse methods to evaluate them 
beyond statistical validation.269  Among other recommendations discussed in 
Part IV, the guidance recommends “outcomes analysis,” which calls for 
“expert judgment to check the intuition behind the outcomes and confirm that 
the results make sense.”270 
In an advisory bulletin about new financial technology, the Federal 
Reserve Board recommended that individual features have a “nexus” with 
creditworthiness to avoid discriminating in violation of fair lending laws.271  
In their view, a nexus enables a “careful analysis” about the features assigned 
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significance in a model predicting creditworthiness.272  Here, intuitiveness is 
read into ECOA as a natural requirement of having to justify decision-making 
that generates a disparate impact via the “business-necessity” defense.273  
The business-necessity defense asks whether the particular decision-making 
mechanism has a tight enough fit with the legitimate trait being predicted274 
and whether there were equally effective but less discriminatory ways to 
accomplish the same task.  With a model that lacks intuitive relationships, a 
plaintiff could argue that the model is indirectly—and thus poorly—
measuring some latent and more sensible variable that should serve as the 
actual basis of decision-making.  The Federal Reserve Board guidance 
suggests that one way to avoid an uncertain result in such litigation is to limit 
decision-making to features that bear an intuitive—and therefore 
justifiable—relationship to the outcome of interest.  While it is not clear that 
relying on proxies for an unrecognized latent variable presents problems 
under current disparate impact doctrine,275 the guidance treats an intuition 
requirement as a prophylactic.  This reasoning seems to underlie the 
recommendations of Kim as well as Grimmelmann and Westreich. 
What should be clear by now is that intuition is the typical bridge from 
explanation to normative assessment.  This can be a good thing.  Intuition is 
powerful.  It is a ready mechanism by which considerable knowledge can be 
brought to bear in evaluating machine learning models.  Such models are 
myopic, having visibility into only the data upon which they were trained.276  
Humans, in contrast, have a wealth of insights accumulated through a broad 
range of experiences, typically described as “common sense.”  This 
knowledge allows us to immediately identify and discount patterns that 
violate our well-honed expectations and to recognize and affirm discoveries 
that align with experience.  In fact, intuition is so powerful that humans 
cannot resist speculating about latent variables or causal mechanisms when 
confronted by unexplained phenomena. 
Intuition can also take the form of domain expertise, which further 
strengthens the capacity to see where models may have gone awry.  The 
social sciences have a long history of relying on face validity to determine 
whether a model is measuring what it purports to measure.277  A model that 
assigns significance to variables that seem facially irrelevant is given little 
credence or is subject to greater scrutiny.  Such a practice might seem ad hoc, 
but questioning face validity is a fundamental part of the social-scientific 
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process.  Crucially, intuition allows us to generate competing explanations 
that account for the observed facts and to debate their plausibility.278 
Importantly, however, intuition has its downsides.  Most immediately, it 
can be wrong.  It can lead us to discount valid models because they are 
unexpected or unfamiliar, or to endorse false discoveries because they align 
with existing beliefs.279  Intuition encourages us to generate “just so” stories 
that appear to make good sense of the presented facts.  Such stories may feel 
coherent but are actually unreliable.  In fact, the rich literature on cognitive 
biases—including the “narrative fallacy”—is really an account of the dangers 
of intuition.280  While intuition is helpful for assessing evidently good and 
bad results, it is less useful when dealing with findings that do not comport 
with or even run counter to experience.  The overriding power of intuition 
means that strange results will stand out, but intuition may not point in a 
productive direction for making these any more sensible. 
This is a particularly pronounced problem in the case of machine learning, 
as its value lies largely in finding patterns that go well beyond human 
intuition.  The problem in such cases is not only that machine learning models 
might depart from intuition, but that they might not even lend themselves to 
hypotheses about what accounts for the models’ discoveries.  Parsimonious 
models lend themselves to more intuitive reasoning, but they have limits—a 
complex world may require complex models.  In some cases, machine 
learning will have the power to detect the subtle patterns and intricate 
dependencies that can better account for reality. 
If the interest in explanation stems from its intrinsic or pragmatic value, 
then addressing inscrutability is worthwhile for its own sake.  But if we are 
interested in whether models are well justified, then addressing inscrutability 
only gets us part of the way.  We should consider how else to justify models.  
We should think outside the black box and return to the question:  Why are 
these the rules? 
IV.  DOCUMENTATION AS EXPLANATION 
Limiting explanation of a model to its internal mechanics forces us to rely 
on intuition to guess at why the model’s rules are what they are.  But what 
would it look like for regulation to directly seek an answer to that question?  
By now, it is well understood that data are human constructs281 and that 
subjective decisions pervade the modeling and decision-making process.282  
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Explaining why the model works as it does requires accounting for these 
decisions. 
Furnishing such answers will require process, documentation, and access 
to that documentation.  This can be done in a public format, with impact 
assessments, or companies can do it privately, with access triggered on some 
basis, like discovery in litigation. 
A.  The Information Needed to Evaluate Models 
When we seek to evaluate the justifications for decision-making that relies 
on a machine learning model, we are actually asking about the institutional 
and subjective process behind its development.  The Federal Reserve Board 
guidance discussed in Part III.B moves in this direction by recommending 
documentation, but its approach appears to be mostly about validation—how 
to validate well, thoroughly, on an ongoing basis, and in preparation for a 
future legal challenge.283  Careful validation is essential and nontrivial,284 
but it is also not enough.  Normatively evaluating decision-making requires, 
at least, an understanding of:  (1) the values and constraints that shape the 
conceptualization of the problem, (2) how these values and constraints 
inform the development of machine learning models and are ultimately 
reflected in them, and (3) how the outputs of models inform final decisions. 
To illustrate how each of these components work, consider credit scoring.  
What are the values embedded in credit-scoring models and under what 
constraints do developers operate?  Lenders could attempt to achieve 
different objectives with credit scoring at the outset:  Credit scoring could 
aim to ensure that all credit is ultimately repaid, thus minimizing default.  
Lenders could use credit scoring to maximize profit.  Lenders could also seek 
to find ways to offer credit specifically to otherwise overlooked applicants, 
as many firms engaged in alternative credit scoring seek to do.  Each of these 
different goals reflects different core values, but other value judgments might 
be buried in the projects as well.  For example, a creditor could be morally 
committed to offering credit as widely as possible, while for others that does 
not factor into the decision.  Or a creditor’s approach to regulation could be 
to either get away with as much as possible or steer far clear of regulatory 
scrutiny.  Each of these subjective judgments will ultimately inform the way 
a project of credit scoring is conceived. 
The developers of credit-scoring models will also face constraints and 
trade-offs.  For example, there might be limits on available talent with both 
domain expertise and the necessary technical skills to build models.  Models 
might be better informed if there were much more data available, even though 
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there are practical challenges to collecting so much data.  Ultimately, both 
trade-offs are issues of cost,285 but they include more practical realities as 
well, such as limitations on talent in the geographical area of the firm or 
privacy concerns that limit the collection of more data.  How to deal with 
these trade-offs is a judgment call every firm will have to make.286 
Another cost-related trade-off is competition.  Before credit scoring was 
popular, creditors used to work with borrowers over the lifetime of the loan 
to ensure repayment; credit scores first took hold in banks as a way to reduce 
the cost of this practice.287  Creditors today could return to that model, but it 
would likely involve offering higher interest rates across the board to account 
for increased operating costs, perhaps pushing such a firm out of the market.  
As a result, competition operates as a constraint that ultimately changes the 
decision process. 
The values of and constraints faced by a firm will lead to certain choices 
about how to build and use models.  As we have discussed in prior work, the 
subjective choices a developer makes include choosing target variables, 
collecting training data, labeling examples, and choosing features.288  
Developers must also make choices about other parts of the process, such as 
how to treat outliers, how to partition their data for testing, what learning 
algorithms to choose, and how and how much to tune the model, among other 
things.289  The act of developing models is quite complex and involves many 
subjective decisions by the developers. 
In the credit example, the values discussed above may manifest in the 
model in several ways.  For example, consider the different project objectives 
discussed above.  If a firm seeks to maximize profit, it may employ a model 
with a different target variable than a firm that seeks to minimize defaults.  
The target variable is often the outcome that the model developers want to 
maximize or minimize, so in the profit-seeking case, it would be expected 
profit per applicant, and in the risk-based case, it could be likelihood of 
default.  While the alternative credit-scoring model hypothesized above 
might rely on the same likelihood-of-default target variable, firms’ values are 
likely to influence the type of data they collect; they might seek alternative 
data sources, for example, because they are trying to reach underserved 
populations.  In addition to the values embedded a priori, the values of the 
firms dictate how they resolve the different constraints they face—for 
example, cost and competition.  The traditional credit scorers tend to not 
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make the extra effort or spend the extra money to obtain the data needed to 
make predictions about people on the margins of society.290  There is also 
regulatory uncertainty regarding the permissibility of new types of credit 
data.291  Therefore, their models reflect the fact that the developers are more 
sensitive to cost and regulatory penalty than inclusion. 
Models are not self-executing; an additional layer of decisions concerns 
the institutional process that surrounds the model.  Are the model outputs 
automatically accepted as the ultimate decisions?292  If not, how central is 
the model to the decision?  How do decision makers integrate the model into 
their larger decision frameworks?  How are they trained to do so?  What role 
does discretion play? 
These questions are all external to the model, but they directly impact the 
model’s importance and normative valence.  For example, certain creditors 
may automatically reject applicants with a predicted likelihood of default that 
exceeds 50 percent.293  Others, however, may opt to be more inclusive.  
Perhaps a local credit union that is more familiar with its members and has a 
community-service mission might decide that human review is necessary for 
applicants whose likelihood of default sits between 40 percent and 
60 percent, leaving the final decision to individual loan officers.  A similar 
creditor might adopt a policy where applicants that the model is not able to 
score with confidence are subject to human review, especially where the 
outcome would otherwise be an automatic rejection of members of legally 
protected classes. 
Many of these high-level questions about justifying models or particular 
uses of models are not about models at all, but whether certain policies are 
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acceptable independent of whether they use machine learning.294  Questions 
about justifying a model are often just questions about policy in disguise.295  
For example, a predatory lender could use the exact same prediction of 
default to find prime candidates in underserved communities and offer them 
higher interest rates than they might otherwise receive.  This will create more 
profit because the underserved loan candidates will be more willing to pay a 
higher rate, but it is clearly predation:  interest rates are not being used to 
offset risk, but to extract maximum profit from vulnerable consumers.296  
Most importantly, that this practice is predatory can be judged with no 
reference to the credit-scoring model. 
Evaluating models in a justificatory sense means comparing the reasoning 
behind the choices made by the developers against society’s broader 
normative priorities, as expressed in law and policy.  In order to perform this 
evaluation, then, documentation about the decisions that lie behind and 
become part of models must exist and be made available for scrutiny.  With 
an understanding of what that information looks like, the next section begins 
to explore how to ensure access. 
B.  Providing the Necessary Information 
Assuming the documentation exists, there are numerous ways it can 
become open to scrutiny.  For purposes of demonstration, two are discussed 
here, although many more are possible:  (1) the possibility that 
documentation is made publicly available from the start and (2) that it 
becomes accessible upon some trigger, like litigation.  The former is 
essentially an algorithmic impact statement (AIS),297 a proposed variant of 
the original impact statements required by the National Environmental Policy 
Act.298  The most common trigger of the latter is a lawsuit, in which 
documents can be obtained and scrutinized and witnesses can be deposed or 
examined on the stand, but auditing requirements are another possibility.  In 
both approaches, the coupling of existing documentation with a way to access 
it create answers to the question of what happened in the design process, with 
the goal of allowing overseers to determine whether those choices were 
justifiable.  Like FCRA and ECOA, these examples have no inherent 
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connection to machine learning, but the methods can be easily applied in this 
context. 
An impact statement is a document designed to explain the process of 
decision-making and the anticipated effects of that decision in such a way as 
to open the process up to the public.  Generally, the requirement is designed 
to ensure that developers do their homework, create a public record, and 
include public comments.299  Impact statements are an idea that originated in 
1970 with the National Environmental Policy Act300 and have since been 
emulated repeatedly at all levels of government, in many substantive areas of 
policy.301  Aside from environmental law, the federal government requires 
privacy impact assessments “when developing or procuring information 
technology systems that include personally identifiable information.”302  
Individual states not only have their own legislation requiring environmental 
impact statements,303 but also racial impact statements for sentencing policy, 
among other requirements.304  Recently, led by the ACLU’s Community 
Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) initiative,305 counties and cities 
have begun requiring impact statements that apply to police purchases of new 
technology.306 
One of us has argued that a future AIS requirement should be expressly 
modeled on the environmental impact statement (EIS):  the original and most 
thorough version, with the fullest explanation requirements.  Such an impact 
statement would require thoroughly explaining the types of choices discussed 
above.  This includes direct choices about the model, such as target variables, 
whether and how new data was collected, and what features were considered.  
It also requires a discussion of the options that were considered but not 
chosen, and the reasons for both.307  Those reasons would—either explicitly 
or implicitly—include discussion of the practical constraints faced by the 
developers and the values that drove decisions.  The AIS must also discuss 
the predicted impacts of both the chosen and unchosen paths, including the 
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possibility of no action, and the effects of any potential mitigation 
procedures.308 
The typical American example of an impact statement is a public 
document.  Thus, a law requiring them would also require that the developers 
publish the document and allow for comments between the draft and final 
impact statements.309  Of course, such an idea is more palatable in the case 
of regulation of public agencies.  While disclosure of the kinds of information 
we describe does not actually imply disclosure of the model itself—obviating 
the need for a discussion of trade secrets and gaming—firms may still be 
reluctant to publish an AIS that reveals operating strategy, perceived 
constraints, or even embedded values.  Thus, it is also useful to consider a 
documentation requirement that allows the prepared documents to remain 
private but available as needed for accountability.310 
A provision of the GDPR actually does just this.  Article 35 requires “data 
protection impact assessments” (DPIAs) whenever data processing “is likely 
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.”311  As 
Edwards and Veale discuss, the DPIA requirement is very likely to apply to 
machine learning,312 and the assessments require “appropriate technical and 
organizational measures” to protect data subject rights.313  In Europe, DPIAs 
are private documents, though making summaries public is officially 
encouraged.314  The European solution to making this private document 
available is to require consultation with the member state data protection 
authorities whenever the DPIA indicates a high risk of interference with data 
subject rights.315 
One could imagine another way of making an essentially private impact 
assessment accessible, initiated by private litigation.  Interrogatories, 
depositions, document subpoenas, and trial testimony are all tools that enable 
litigation parties to question human witnesses and examine documents.  
These are all chances to directly ask model developers what choices they 
made and why they made them. 
A hypothetical will help clarify how these opportunities, coupled with 
documentation—whether a DPIA or something similar—differ from the use 
of intuition as a method of justification.  Imagine a new alternative credit-
scoring system that relies on social media data.316  This model assigns 
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significance to data points that are unintuitive but reliably predict default.  
Suppose the model also evinces a disparate impact along racial lines, as 
revealed by investigative journalists. 
Black applicants denied credit then bring suit under the substantive 
nondiscrimination provisions of ECOA.  Assuming, reasonably, that the 
judge agrees that disparate impact is a viable theory under ECOA,317 the case 
will turn on the business-necessity defense.  Thus, in order to determine 
whether there was a legal violation, it is necessary to know why the designer 
of the model proceeded in using the particular features from social media and 
whether there were equally effective alternatives with less disparate impact. 
Under an intuition-driven regime, such as that proposed by either Kim or 
Grimmelmann and Westreich, the case would begin with a finding of prima 
facie disparate impact, and then, to evaluate the business-necessity defense, 
the plaintiffs might put the lead engineer on the stand.  The attorney would 
ask why social media data was related to the ultimate judgment of 
creditworthiness.  The engineer would respond that the model showed they 
were related:  “the data says so.”  She is not able to give a better answer 
because the social media data has no intuitive link to creditworthiness.318  
Under their proposed regime, the inquiry would end.  The defendant has not 
satisfied its burden and would be held liable.319 
Under a regime of mandated documentation and looking beyond the logic 
of the model, other explanations could be used in the model’s defense.  
Rather than be required to intuitively link the social media data to the 
creditworthiness, the engineer would be permitted to answer why the model 
relies on the social media data in the first place.  The documentation might 
show, or the engineer might testify, that her team tested the model with and 
without the social media data and found that using the data reduced the 
disproportionate impact of the model.320  Alternatively, the documentation 
might demonstrate that the team considered more intuitive features that 
guaranteed similar model performance but discovered that such features were 
exceedingly difficult or costly to measure.  The company then used social 
media data because it improved performance and reduced disparate impact 
under the practical constraints faced by the company. 
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These justifications are not self-evidently sufficient to approve of the 
credit model in this hypothetical.  Certainly, reducing disparate impact seems 
like a worthwhile goal.  In fact, prohibiting or discouraging decision makers 
from using unintuitive models that exhibit any disparate impact may have the 
perverse effect of maintaining a disparate impact.  Cost is a more difficult 
normative line321 and would likely require a case-by-case analysis.  While 
intuition-based evaluation—and its reliance on default rules—would forbid 
the consideration of either of these motivations for using social media data, 
both rationales should at least enter into the discussion.322 
Having to account for all the decisions made in the process of project 
inception and model development should reveal subjective judgments that 
can and should be evaluated.  This kind of explanation is particularly useful 
where intuition fails.  In most cases, these decisions would not be 
immediately readable from the model.323  Recall that intuition is most useful 
where explanations of a model reveal obviously good or bad reasons for 
decision-making but will often offer no help to evaluate a strange result.  
Documentation will help because it provides a different way of connecting 
the model to normative concerns.  In cases where the individual features are 
not intuitively related to the outcome of interest but there is an obviously 
good or bad reason to use them anyway, documentation will reveal those 
reasons where explanation of the model will not.  Accordingly, these high-
level explanations are a necessary complement to any explanation of the 
internals of the model. 
Documentation will not, however, solve every problem. Even with 
documentation, some models will both defy intuition and resist normative 
clarity.  Regardless, a regime of documentation leaves open the possibility of 
developing other ways of asking whether this was a well-executed project, 
including future understanding of what constitutes best practice.  As common 
flaws become known, checking for them becomes simply a matter of being 
responsible.  A safe harbor or negligence-based oversight regime may 
emerge or become attractive as the types of choices faced by firms become 
known and standardized.324  Documentation of the decisions made will be 
necessary to developing such a regime. 
 
 321. See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment 
Discrimination Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 322. Documentation provides a further benefit unrelated to explanation.  If the requirement 
for an intuitive link is satisfied, then the case moves to the alternative practice prong, which 
looks to determine whether there was another model the creditor “refuses” to use. Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).  Normally, a “fix-the-model” response will not be 
persuasive because it is difficult to tell exactly how it went wrong, and what alternatives the 
developers had. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 705.  With documentation, the alternatives 
will be plainly visible because that is exactly what has been documented. 
 323. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 715. 
 324. See generally William Smart, Cindy Grimm & Woody Hartzog, An Education Theory 
of Fault for Autonomous Systems (Mar. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.werobot2017.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Smart-Grimm-Hartzog-
Education-We-Robot.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WJM-4ZQH]. 
1138 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
While there will certainly still be strange results for which neither intuition 
nor documentation works today, the overall set of cases we cannot evaluate 
will shrink considerably with documentation available. 
CONCLUSION 
Daniel Kahneman has referred to the human mind as a “machine for 
jumping to conclusions.”325  Intuition is a basic component of human 
reasoning, and reasoning about the law is no different.  It should therefore 
not be surprising that we are suspicious of strange relationships in models 
that admit no intuitive explanation at all.  The natural inclination at this point 
is to regulate machine learning such that its outputs comport with intuition. 
This has led to calls for regulation by explanation.  Inscrutability is the 
property of machine learning models that is seen as the problem, and the 
target of the majority of proposed remedies.  The legal and technical work 
addressing the problem of inscrutability has been motivated by different 
beliefs about the utility of explanations:  inherent value, enabling action, and 
providing a way to evaluate the basis of decision-making.  While the first two 
rationales may have their own merits, the law has more substantial and 
concrete concerns that must be addressed.  Those who believe solving 
inscrutability provides a path to normative evaluation also fall short because 
they fail to recognize the role of intuition. 
Solving inscrutability is a necessary step, but the limitations of intuition 
will prevent normative assessment in many cases.  Where intuition fails, the 
task should be to find new ways to regulate machine learning so that it 
remains accountable.  Otherwise, maintaining an affirmative requirement for 
intuitive relationships will potentially impede discoveries and opportunities 
that machine learning can offer, including those that would reduce bias and 
discrimination. 
Just as restricting evaluation to intuition will be costly, so would 
abandoning it entirely.  Intuition serves as an important check that cannot be 
provided by quantitative modes of validation.  But while there will always be 
a role for intuition, we will not always be able to use it to bypass the question 
of why the rules are the rules.  We need the developers to show their work. 
Documentation can relate the subjective choices involved in applying 
machine learning to the normative goals of substantive law.  Much of the 
discussion surrounding models implicates important policy discussions, but 
does so indirectly.  Often, when models are employed to change a way of 
making decisions, too much focus is placed on the technology itself instead 
of the policy changes that either led to the adoption of the technology or were 
wrought by its adoption.326  Quite aside from correcting one failure mode of 
intuition, documentation has a separate worth in laying bare the kinds of 
value judgments that go into designing these systems and allowing society to 
engage in a clearer normative debate in the future. 
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We cannot and should not abandon intuition.  But only by recognizing the 
role intuition plays in our normative reasoning can we recognize that there 
are other ways.  To complement intuition, we need to ask whether people 
have made reasonable judgments about competing values under their real-
world constraints.  Only humans can answer these questions. 
